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ABSTRACT

The United States Supreme Court's 1924 Weiss v. Steam decision
involved a classic case of corporate dilution. In that case, a corporation
("Oldco') transferred its business to a new corporation ("Newco ') in a
transaction in which the Oldco shareholders surrenderedall their stock for
50 percent of the stock of Newco (and cash). The transaction diluted the
proprietary interest of the Oldco shareholders from 100 percent to 50
percent. Because the Oldco shareholders surrendered control of the
enterprise, the 50 percent interest they received in Newco was fundamentally
different from the 100 percent interest they had owned in Oldco.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the receipt of the Newco shares was not a
taxable event (a "realization event") to the Oldco shareholders. The Court
reachedthis result by ignoring the dilution that occurredin the case.
In 1991, the Supreme Court resurrectedthe Weiss v. Steam decision
in the Cottage Savings case. There, the Court relied on Weiss v. Stearn to
establish that the exchange ofproperty triggersa realizationevent only if the
property received is "materially different" from the property surrendered
Once again, the Court ignored the dilution that occurred in Weiss v. Steam.
As a result, Supreme Courtjurisprudencesheds no light on the question of
whether corporatedilution can triggerrealization.
Corporatedilution is a common phenomenon. It can result from an
actual exchange of proprietary interests, like the transaction in Weiss v.
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Steam. It can also occur when a shareholder does not physically transfer
shares. For example, ifa sole shareholder of a corporationsells 50 percent
of her stock to a thirdparty, the diluted 50 percent interest she retains is as
different from the 100 percent interest she previously owned, as were the
interests in Weiss v. Steam. Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of dilutive
transactions,no significant scholarship addresses the impact of dilution on
realization.
This Article explores the fundamental question of when corporate
dilution should trigger realization. By virtue of the "material difference"
standard that emerged from Cottage Savings, the transaction in Weiss v.
Steam should be treated as a realization event. Specifically, the loss of
control that resulted from the Steam transaction left the original
shareholders with a materially different interest in the enterprise. More
significantly, the material difference standardshould be extended to treat
realization as occurring in an equally dilutive transaction that does not
entail a physical transfer of the diluted interest. As long as a material
difference exists, the shareholder should be treated as engaging in a
"deemed exchange" of the 100 percent interestfor the 50 percent interest,
thereby triggeringa realization event. Now that nine decades have passed
since the Steam decision was rendered, it is high time for the impact of
dilution on realizationto be clarified.
"Since the [Eisner v.] Macomber decision in 1920, the
Supreme Court has found an absence of realization to be
significant in only one case." 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most fundamental principles of federal income taxation is
the realization requirement, enunciated by the Supreme Court as a
constitutional mandate in Eisner v. Macomber.2 By virtue of this
requirement, an increase in the value of property is not taxed at the time the
appreciation occurs. Rather, a "realization event" (normally thought of as a

1.
Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual
Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. REV. 857, 857 n.1
(1982) (citing Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924)). The statement in the text
remains true in 2015.
2.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). The Court has since retreated
from its original view and now regards the realization requirement as primarily an
administrative rule of convenience. See infra Part III (discussing the evolution of the
realization requirement).

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 17:2

an increase in the value of
sale or exchange of property) is required before
3
base.
tax
income
the
in
property is included
From an economic perspective, an income tax should tax any
increase in a taxpayer's wealth when it occurs. 4 Imposing the additional
requirement of a realization event, therefore, distorts the timing of income.
This distortion is justified on administrative grounds-measuring changes in
asset values in the absence of a sale or exchange of property is a process that
is believed to be too inexact and cumbersome to incorporate in an income tax
system. 5 Commentators have frequently challenged this conclusion, 6 but the
realization requirement remains a well-ensconced feature of the U.S. income
tax.

7

In light of the artificial deferral conferred by the realization
requirement, one would expect the tax system to impose an extremely low
hurdle for realization to occur. Surprisingly, the hurdle is higher than one
might think. One of us has previously examined the omission of certain

3.

Although no statutory definition of a realization event exists, the

requirement is inferred from I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (gains from "dealings" in property)
and I.R.C. § 1001(a) (gain from the "sale or other disposition" of property). I.R.C.
§§ 61(a)(3); 1001(a).
4.

See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION

OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (5th prtg. 1965) ("Personal income
may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and the end of the period in question."); ROSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE
INCOME 17 (1936) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to economic
power between two points in time.").
5.
See generally Victor Thuronyi, The Taxation of Corporate Income-A
Proposalfor Reform, 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 109, 126 (1983) [hereinafter Thuronyi,
Corporate Income] (explaining that the failure to tax unrealized income is defended
on the basis that annual asset valuations would be impractical).
Various proposals have been advanced to adopt a "mark-to-market" tax
6.
system that would tax asset appreciation as it accrues. See generally David J.
Shakow, Taxation Without Realization:A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 1111 (1986) (discussing a proposal for an accrual income tax system);
David Slawson, Taxing as OrdinaryIncome the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock,
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967) (advancing a proposal to tax the stock of publicly held
corporations as such stock appreciates); Thuronyi, Corporate Income, supra note 5,
at 109 (discussing the repeal of the corporate income tax on publicly held
corporations and taxing shareholders on the annual increase in the value of their
shares).
7.
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing
Legacy of Realization, in TAX STORIES 93, 134 (Paul L. Caron ed., Foundation Press
2nd ed. 2009) ("[B]roader proposals to switch to an accretion system have not metand most likely will not meet-with success.").
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dispositions of property from the scope of a realization event. 8 Specifically,
under current law, a disposition of property does not result in realization
unless a quantifiable benefit is received by the transferor. 9 For this reason,
inter vivos and testamentary gratuitous transfers of property are generally not
realization events.
In contrast to a gratuitous transfer, realization normally occurs when
property is exchanged for a quantifiable benefit. In 1924, however, the
Supreme Court determined that realization did not occur in Weiss v. Steam, a
case involving a transfer of corporate stock in exchange for stock in a
successor corporation. 10 The Court viewed the successor corporation as
substantively equivalent to its predecessor because the contents of the two
11
corporations were the same and both were incorporated in the same state.
The Court concluded that the mere substitution of a new corporate entity for
the old entity where the owners retainedthe same proportionateinterest did

not trigger realization. 12 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court ignored the
fact that shareholders owning 100 percent of the predecessor received only
50 percent of the stock of the successor (and cash), i.e., the transaction
"diluted" the original shareholder group's proprietary interest from 100
percent to 50 percent.13 As a result, the Court failed to consider whether the
dramatic change that resulted from the dilution (i.e., a loss of control of the
enterprise by the original shareholders) should have triggered realization
with respect to the original shareholders' entire proprietary interest. Because
the Steam Court ignored the dilution issue, the decision sheds no light on the
question of whether a dilutive transaction should trigger realization of gain or
loss with respect to the diluted interest.
In the nine decades since the Stearn decision, the common law of
realization has evolved in a manner that facilitates the taxation of
transactions resulting in significant dilution. Stearn was decided a few years
after Macomber, where the Court treated realization as a constitutional
mandate.' 4 The Court retreated from this view in the 1940s when it
acknowledged that realization was principally an administrative
mechanism. 1 5 In 1991, the Court revisited the realization requirement in
See generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset Appreciation Be
8.
Taxed?. The Casefor a Disposition Standardof Realization, 86 IND. L.J. 77 (2011)
(proposing the adoption of a "disposition" standard of realization).
Id. at 85-86.
9.
10. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924). See also infra Part 1I.A
(explaining the mechanics of the Steam transaction).
Steam, 265 U.S. at 252-53.
11.
12. Id. at 253.
13. Infra Parts II.B., II.C.
14. Infra Part III.A.
15. Infra Part III.B.

52
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Cottage Savings v. Commissioner.16 There, the Court relied on Stearn and a
trilogy of other early Supreme Court cases to articulate an additional
"material difference" requirement for realization. 17 Specifically, when
properties are exchanged, realization occurs only if the property received is
materially different from the property surrendered. 18 To be materially
different, the properties must embody "legal entitlements that are different in
kind or extent." 19 The Cottage Savings Court endorsed the Stearn Court's
holding but continued to ignore the impact on realization of the significant
dilution that occurred in that case. Thus, Supreme Court jurisprudence to
date has not taken a position on the question of whether a dilutive transaction
should trigger realization with respect to the diluted interest.
This Article explores the fundamental question of when corporate
dilution should trigger realization. 20 By virtue of the "material difference"
standard that emerged from Cottage Savings, the transaction in Steam should
be treated as a realization event. Specifically, the loss of control that resulted
from the Steam transaction left the original shareholders with a materially
different interest in the enterprise. 2 1 More significantly, the material
difference standard should be extended to treat realization as occurring in an
equally dilutive transaction that does not entail a physical transfer of the
diluted interest. For example, if a sole shareholder sells 50 percent of her
stock to a third party, the diluted 50 percent interest she retains is as different
from the 100 percent interest she previously owned, as were the diluted and
undiluted interests in Steam. In our view, the absence of a physical transfer
of the diluted interest should not preclude realization from occurring. Rather,
as long as a material difference exists, the shareholder should be regarded as
engaging in a "deemed exchange" of the 100 percent interest for the 50
22
percent interest thereby triggering a realization event.

16. Cottage Sav. Ass'n. v. Commissioner., 499 U.S. 554 (1991). See also
infra Part III.C. (discussing the impact of the Cottage Savings case on the realization
requirement).
17. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 562 (citing United States v. Phellis, 257
U.S. 156 (1921); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Marr v. United States, 268
U.S. 536 (1925); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)).
18. Id. at 561-562.
19. Id. at 565.
20. Surprisingly, no significant scholarship explores this question. For an
article raising related issues in a narrower context, see Herwig J. Schlunk,
Rationalizingthe Taxation of Reorganizationsand Other CorporateAcquisitions, 27
VA. TAX REV. 23 (2007) [hereinafter Schlunk, Rationalizing].
21. InfraPartIV.A.
22. The Treasury has promulgated regulations delineating a "deemed
exchange" analysis in the context of the modification of a debt instrument. Infra Part
III.D. That analysis can be readily extended to those dilutive transactions where a
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Unfortunately, realization is a crude mechanism for differentiating
taxable and nontaxable dilutive transactions and, if relied upon to do so, will
impose a heavy administrative burden on the tax system. 23 This problem
stems from the need to undertake a fact intensive inquiry to determine
whether a material difference exists in any particular case. To remedy this
problem, Congress should presume that realization is triggered when
significant dilution occurs and enact appropriate nonrecognition rules to
defer taxation when such treatment is desirable from a tax policy
24
standpoint.
Part II examines Weiss v. Steam, a case that offered the Court an
ideal opportunity to clarify the impact of dilution on realization. It will show
that the Court ignored the dilution that resulted in that case by artificially
dividing the transaction into two sequential events. 2 5 Bifurcating the
transaction in this manner did not comport with its substance. In substance,
the shareholders of the old entity engaged in a single unified transaction that
resulted in the dilution of their 100 percent proprietary interest to a 50
percent proprietary interest in the new entity. This dramatic change in the
nature of the original shareholders' proprietary interest should have triggered
26
realization with respect to the diluted interest.
Part III explores the evolution of the realization requirement
subsequent to Steam. It will delineate the progression from constitutional
mandate to administrative mechanism to a substantive concept when the
Court, in Cottage Savings, articulated the material difference standard. It will
also examine Treasury Regulations that formalize the notion of a "deemed
exchange." These developments create a pathway for treating certain dilutive
transactions as realization events under current law.
Part IV identifies the circumstances in which a dilutive transaction
should be treated as a realization event; namely, when a material difference
material difference exists but the retained interest is not physically transferred. Infra
Part IV.B.
23. Infra Part IV.D.
24. These nonrecognition rules would also presumably apply when a loss is
realized (i.e., when the diluted interest has a basis in excess of value).
25. Infra Part II.C. First, the original shareholders were treated as selling 50
percent of the stock of the old corporate entity. Second, the original shareholders
were treated as exchanging the remaining 50 percent of the old entity's stock for 50
percent of the new entity's stock in a non-dilutive transaction (i.e., the original
shareholders owned 50 percent of the enterprise both before and after this isolated
step).
26. As one of the earliest commentators on the Weiss v. Steam case
remarked, "the Court ... found no realization of income in Weiss v. Steam in which,
taking the stockholder's entire interest in the old company as a unit, the economic
changes were the most pronounced." Henry Rottschaefer, Concept of Income in
Federal Taxation, 13 MINN. L. REV. 637, 652 (1929).
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exists between a pre-dilution and a post-dilution proprietary interest. It will
also examine when a dilutive transaction in which the diluted interest is not
physically transferred should trigger a realization event. Finally, it will
discuss the role that Congress should play in creating an administrable
system for distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable dilutive
transactions.
1I. WEISS V. STEARN: SUPREME COURT IGNORES CORPORATE
DILUTION

Weiss v. Steam involved the transfer, in 1916, of all the stock of a
corporation in exchange for half the stock of a successor corporation and
cash. The transaction occurred during the infancy of the tax law, a few years
after enactment of the 16th Amendment in 1913.27 The primitive 1916
statute imposed a tax on "gains ...derived from ... sales, or dealings in
,2'The government claimed the stock exchange in Steam was a
property ....
"dealing in property" that triggered tax on the entire gain in the stock of the
predecessor corporation. 29 The two corporations, however, were
substantively similar; each owned the same assets and was governed by the
laws of the same state. As a result, the taxpayers convinced the courts that
the physical exchange of share certificates should be ignored and the
taxpayers should be treated as selling only half of their proprietary interest;
namely, the 50 percent interest they surrendered for cash.3 °
The transaction in Steam substantially diluted the taxpayers'
interests. Before the transaction, the taxpayers' owned 100 percent of the
enterprise; after the transaction, the taxpayers' only owned 50 percent of the
enterprise. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayers did not realize gain
with respect to their 50 percent retained interest. 3 1 In reaching this result, the
Court ignored the dramatic change in the nature of the taxpayers' property
resulting from their surrender of control of the enterprise.

27. U.S. . amend. XVI. Shortly after the 16th amendment was ratified,
Congress passed the Tariff Act of 1913 which imposed a tax on "net income" which
included "gains, profits, and income derived from ... sales, or dealings in property.
...Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 11(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. Earlier versions of the
income tax date to the Civil War years. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49,
12 Stat. 292, 309.
28. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757 ("[T]he net
income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from ...
sales, or dealings in property . .
29. See infra Part II.B. 1.
30. See infra Parts II.B.2-3.
31. Steam, 265 U.S. at 254.
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A.

The 1916 Transaction

The Steam transaction involved a series of steps in which the
shareholders of a predecessor corporation ultimately received a 50 percent
interest in a successor corporation and cash. The shares and cash were not
transferred directly between the parties. Instead, a financial intermediary
("Depositary") collected the shares of both corporations and the cash, then
subsequently disbursed the shares of the successor corporation and the cash
to the designated parties. 3 2 The contract delineates the following five steps:
1. Shareholders of Old Acme Transfer Old Acme Shares (Valued at
$15 Million) to Depositary
On November 8, 1916, Louis Steam and certain other shareholders
("Vendors") of The National Acme Manufacturing Company ("Old Acme")
contracted to sell all of their stock to Eastman, Dillon & Company
("Purchasers") via The Cleveland Trust Company ("Depositary"). Old Acme
was an Ohio corporation with 50,000 shares outstanding with a value, based
on the contract, of $15 million ($300 per share).3 3 The contract became
operative only if at least 80 percent of the stock of Old Acme was deposited
with Depositary. 34 The shareholders of Old Acme ultimately deposited all
35
50,000 outstanding shares with Depositary.

32.

33.
follows:

The shares of the predecessor corporation were presumably retired.

50,000 shares x $300/share = $15,000,000. The contract provided as

First-The Vendors agree to and will sell all their said shares of
common capital stock to, and the Purchasers agree to and will
purchase the same from them, as well as any and all shares of the
common capital stock of [Old Acme], the holders of which deposit
the same with the depositary . . subject to the terms of this
agreement, at and for the price of Three Hundred Dollars ($300)
per share, payable one half in cash and one half in securities ....
Statement of Agreed Facts at Exhibit A, p. 1, 1, Steam v. Weiss, No. 10126 (N.D.
Ohio, 1922) [hereinafter Statement of Agreed Facts].
34.
The contract specifically provided, "[T]his contract is made upon the
express condition, that it shall not become operative unless, on or before December
1st, A.D. 1916, at least eighty per centum (80%) of the entire outstanding common
capital stock of said company is deposited hereunder, for sale in accordance with the
terms hereof, with said depositary." Id., para. First (Apr. 9, 1920).
35.
Steam, 265 U.S. at 251 ("Respondents and other owners delivered duly
indorsed certificates representing the entire capital stock ($5,000,000) of the
National Acme Manufacturing Company . . . to the Cleveland Trust Company, as
depositary.").
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2. Purchasers Transfer $7,500,000 to Depositary
After the shareholders of Old Acme deposited at least 80 percent of
the outstanding stock with Depositary, the Purchasers were required to
deliver $7,500,000 in cash to Depositary.3 6
3. Shareholders of Old Acme and Purchasers Form New Acme
The contract required the Vendors and Purchasers to incorporate a
new Ohio corporation with powers that were similar to those of Old Acme,
under the name of The National Acme Company ("New Acme"). New Acme
was authorized to issue 500,000 shares of stock.37
4. Old Acme Transfers All Assets and Liabilities (Valued at $15
Million Net) to New Acme, and New Acme Issues All of Its
Stock (Valued at $15 Million) to Depositary
After New Acme was incorporated, it purchased all the assets and
assumed all the liabilities of Old Acme. 38 In consideration, New Acme
issued all of its authorized shares but it did not transfer those shares to Old
Acme. Instead, the contract instructed New Acme to issue all the shares to
Depositary. 39 The fact that the New Acme stock was issued to Depositary

36. Once the 80 percent threshold of deposited stock was reached, the
contract required the Purchasers to deposit the sum of $7,500,000 in two lump sums
with Depositary. Statement of Agreed Facts, supra note 33, at Exhibit A, pp. 2-3,

3.
37. Id. at Exhibit A, p. 3. The new company had no value as a shell
corporation. When it acquired $15 million of net assets from Old Acme, the shares
of New Acme had a value of $30 per share ($15,000,000/500,000 shares = $30).
38. Id. at Exhibit A, p. 1. The contract provided as follows: "Purchasers and
Vendors will cause such proceedings to be had by its stockholders and directors as
will cause [New Acme] to purchase all the property and assets ... of [Old Acme]..
subject to all its outstanding contracts and liabilities ... which are to be assumed
by [New Acme] ... in consideration of ... its entire authorized issue of stock, and
to issue such stock in payment therefore." Order on Findings of Fact at p. 3, Steam
v. Weiss, No. 10126 (N.D. Ohio, 1922) [hereinafter Order on Findings of Fact]
(quoting Contract at 4).
39. The contract provided as follows: "The Purchasers and Vendors will
cause all the stock of [New Acme] to be issued to ... Depositary ... to be held and
distributed by it as hereafter provided." Order on Findings of Fact, supra note 38, at
p. 3 (quoting Contract at 4). See also Statement of Agreed Facts, supra note 33, at
Exhibit A, p. 3. The Agreement references consideration of $25 million which is the
par value of New Acme stock, not the fair market value. New Acme's fair market
value was a function of the assets it acquired which was $15 million, assuming the
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rather than Old Acme makes it impossible to determine whether Purchasers
acquired 50 percent of the New Acme stock from New Acme, or whether the
Purchasers acquired 50 percent of the Old Acme stock from the shareholders
of Old Acme (and received their 50 percent of New Acme when Old Acme
on the tax consequences of
liquidated). The implications of this uncertainty
40
the transaction will be discussed below.
5. Depositary Transfers:
(a) 250,000 Shares of New Acme (Valued at $7.5 Million) to
Purchasers, and
(b) 250,000 Shares of New Acme (Valued at $7.5 Million)
and $7.5 Million Cash to Original Shareholders of Old Acme
Once New Acme became the owner of Old Acme's business,
Depositary was instructed to transfer one-half (250,000 shares) of the
500,000 New Acme shares to Purchasers. 4 ' Assuming the stock of New
Acme had a market value equivalent to the $15 million market value of the
Old Acme shares (50,000 shares at $300 per share), Purchasers received $7.5
million of stock (50 percent of the $15 million value of New Acme) for the
$7.5 million Purchasers had deposited with Depositary (see 2., above).
In addition, Depositary was instructed to pay the shareholders of Old
Acme $150 for each Old Acme share deposited with it. Because all 50,000
outstanding shares of Old Acme were deposited with Depositary, Depositary
paid out the entire $7.5 million deposited by Purchasers to the original Old
Acme shareholders.42
Finally, Depositary was instructed to retain the remaining 250,000
shares of New Acme (with a value of $7.5 million), along with the
corresponding voting rights, until May 31, 1917, when it was to be released
to the depositing Old Acme shareholders by distributing five New Acme
shares (at a value of $30 per share; $150 for five shares) for each of the
50,000 Old Acme shares (which had a value of $300 per share).43 Thus, the
Old Acme shareholders transferred Old Acme stock with a value of $15
million and ultimately received $7.5 million in cash and 50 percent of the
stock of New Acme with a value of $7.5 million.
value of Old Acme's net assets was equivalent to the value of Old Acme's stock
(stipulated to be $15 million).
40.

See infra Part HI.C.

41. Order on Findings of Fact, supra note 38, at pp. 3-4 (quoting Contract at
5(a)).
42. 50,000 shares x $150/share = $7.5 million. Statement of Agreed Facts,
supra note 33, at Exhibit A, p. 4, 5(a).
43.

Id.

FloridaTax Review

58

B.

[Vol. 17:2

Neither the PartiesNor the Courts Focus on the Dilution Issue

Not surprisingly, the parties adopted dramatically different views of
the transaction. The government argued realization occurred with respect to
the sellers' entire proprietary interest because all of the shares of one
corporation (Old Acme) were exchanged for other property (New Acme
shares and cash). By contrast, the taxpayers argued that the two corporations
were substantively equivalent and, therefore, the transaction should be
treated as a sale of half of the sellers' proprietary interest in the corporate
enterprise. Neither party focused on the fact that the dilution resulting from
the transaction fundamentally changed the nature of the taxpayers' continued
investment in the enterprise-i.e. they no longer owned a controlling
interest-The lower courts and the Supreme Court also ignored the dilution
issue.
1.

Government: Shareholders Realized Entire Gain Because
They TransferredAll TheirShares

The government argued that the transaction resulted in a sale by each
Old Acme shareholder of his or her holding in Old Acme in exchange for
cash and New Acme stock.4 4 Thus, each taxpayer realized gain equal to the
amount by which the cash and the value of the New Acme stock received
exceeded the original cost of the Old Acme stock.4 5 In the government's
view, the exchange of shares of one corporation for another triggered
realization no matter how similar the two corporations might have been.46 In
44. At the district court, the government characterized the facts stating,
"Stockholders and Officers of [Old Acme] ... agreed to sell to [the Purchasers] ...
their stock in [Old Acme] at and for the price of $300.00 per share, payable one-half
in cash and one-half in Common Stock of [New Acme], a new corporation." Brief
for Defendant at p. 1, 1,Weiss v. Steam, No. 10126 (N.D. Ohio, 1922) [hereinafter
Brief for Defendant]. At the Sixth Circuit, the government continued to characterize
the transaction in this manner, stating "There is nothing in the record in this case
other than the interpretation of the District Court to controvert the clear and
unqualified statement contained in the agreement that all and not one-half of the
stock in the old company was being sold to [the Purchasers]." Brief on behalf of
Plaintiff in Error at p. 8, Weiss v. Steam 285 F. 689 (6th Cir. 1923) (No. 10126)
[hereinafter Brief on behalf of Plaintiff in Error].
45. Brief on behalf of Plaintiff in Error, supra note 44, at p. 6 ("[The Old
Acme stockholder] realized upon his original investment and the amount by which
the cash and securities so received exceeded the original cost of his [Old Acme]
stock was income to him and properly taxable as such.").
46. Id.at pp. 4-12. The government also focused on the fact that the
agreement stated a "sale" had occurred: "The Vendors agree to and will sell all their
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other words, the government apparently believed that the exchange of shares
in different legal entities was sufficient for realization to occur. 47 Although
the government acknowledged that the 50 percent ownership interest in New
Acme received by the Old Acme shareholders was different from their 100
percent interest in Old Acme, 48 it did not focus on the dilution issue.49
2.

Taxpayers: Shareholders Realized Only Half of The Gain
Because They Retained Half of Their ProprietaryInterest

The taxpayers argued that the exchange of Old Acme stock for New
Acme stock did not result in taxable gain for the Old Acme stockholders by
analogizing the case to Eisner v. Macomber.5" In Macomber, the Supreme
Court determined that a pro rata stock dividend was not taxable as income
under the 16th Amendment. 5 1 The taxpayers applied Macomber to Steam by
arguing that if the new corporate entity, New Acme, was ignored, then the
exchange of stock should be treated as a stock dividend followed by a sale of

said shares of common capital stock to, and the Purchasers agree to and will
purchase the same from them." Id. at pp. 7-8 (quoting language from Contract). See
also Statement of Agreed Facts, supra note 33, at Exhibit A, p. 1.
Because the stock received in the exchange represented an interest in a
47.
different legal entity, the Government argued this necessarily led to the conclusion
that a "sale" occurred. Brief on behalf of Plaintiff in Error, supra note 44, at p. 6.
"The transaction was a sale of all of the stock in the old company and
48.
while the corporate assets may have been the same upon its completion as they were
at its inception, it is certainly not true that stockholding interests were identical. As
far as it appears from the record the old stockholders prior to November 8, 1916,
owned an undivided interest in all of the property and assets of [Old Acme].
Subsequent to that date they owned only an undivided one-half interest in the same
property and assets, while an entirely new set of stockholders had become owners of
fifty (50) percent of the stock in the new company." Brief on behalf of Plaintiff in
Error, supra note 44, at pp. 8-9. This point fell by the wayside because the courts
rejected the government's version of the facts (namely, that the taxpayers exchanged
a 100 percent interest in Old Acme for New Acme stock and cash in a single unified
transaction). See infra Part I.C.
49. The government potentially approached the dilution issue in its District
Court brief when it mentioned an early Committee on Appeals and Review decision
26-20-1024, and noted that, "the facts in [the Committee on Appeals and Review
decision] were very similar to those under discussion here, with the exception that no
cash was received by the stockholders making it, therefore, a weaker case than the
present one." Brief for Defendant, supra note 44, at p. 10, 1.
50. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Id. at 204-05. For further discussion of Eisner v. Macomber, see infra
51.
Part III.A.
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a 50 percent interest in the same corporation. 52 The taxpayers effectively
ignored the changes that occurred at the shareholder level in favor of
focusing on how, at the corporate level, Old Acme and New Acme owned
the same assets. 3 Thus, the taxpayers' narrow argument was that the
exchange of stocks should not be taxable because New Acme's status as a
different corporate entity should be ignored.
In effect, therefore, the arguments set forth by the parties' briefs
were essentially whether the transfer of the stock of the predecessor
corporation triggered realization of the entire gain (government), or whether
the new corporation could be ignored and the transaction could be viewed as
a sale of 50 percent of the stock in a single corporation (taxpayers). Neither
party focused on how the dilution of the Old Acme shareholders' 100 percent
interest in Old Acme to a 50 percent ownership interest in New Acme
impacted realization.
3. Courts: Taxpayers Prevail Because Substance Trumps Form

The courts rejected the government's argument that the exchange of
shares in one corporation for shares in another necessarily results in
realization by focusing on the similarity of the two corporate enterprises. In
effect, the two corporate enterprises were treated as one because no
meaningful change had occurred at the corporate level. As the Sixth Circuit
stated,
The same ends might have been achieved by an
amendment of the articles of incorporation providing for the
increase of the capital stock, the reduction of the face value
of its shares, and the change of name ....

Therefore, if the

52. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff, Steam v. Weiss, No. 10126, at p. 5 (N.D.
Ohio, 1922). Specifically, the taxpayer argued that the transaction should be treated
as if Old Acme had changed its corporate name, increased its capital stock from
$5,000,000 to $25,000,000, declared a stock dividend of four hundred percent, and
then the Old Acme shareholders had sold one-half of their Old Acme stock to the
Purchasers.
53. Id. at pp. 8-9. The taxpayer also made this point in the appellate brief;
i.e., that no new money or property went into New Acme apart from the very same
assets and liabilities that made up the business of Old Acme. Brief in Behalf of
Defendant in Error at p. 2, Weiss v. Steam 285 F. 689 (6th Cir. 1923) (No. 3790)
("The National Acme Company had come into existence, an Ohio corporation,
having the same corporate powers and purposes as The National Acme
Manufacturing Company, with a capital of $25,000,000, divided into shares of the
par value of $50.00 each. It had exactly the same property and the same liabilities,
neither more nor less than The National Acme Manufacturing Company, which
property was devoted to the same purposes as it had been when it was the property
of The National Acme Manufacturing Company.").
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transaction be taxable, it must be because of the giving up of
the old and the taking on of the new charter. It is true that a
new corporate being has intervened; but where a corporate
entity has been found to be a mere matter of form, it has
been disregarded in similar transactions in respect of income
taxation.54
The opinion of the Sixth Circuit laid the groundwork for the
Supreme Court to focus on whether the exchange of stock in two similar
corporations results in realization. Like its predecessors, the Supreme Court
55
paid little attention to the form of the transaction and focused on substance.
Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected the significance of the new
corporation at least in circumstances where no other changes occurred.
Applying the general principles of Eisner v.
Macomber, it seems clear that if [Old Acme] had increased
its capital stock to $25,000,000, and then declared a stock
dividend of 400 per cent, the stockholders would have
received no gain-theirproportionate interest would have
remained the same as before....
We cannot conclude that

mere change for purposes of reorganization in the technical
ownership of an enterprise, under circumstances like those
here disclosed, followed by issuance of new certificates
constitutes gain separated from the original capital.56
Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the government's view that a change in
57
corporate entity per se causes realization to occur.
As one might expect, the Steam courts focused on the two views
presented by the parties. After observing that the predecessor and the
successor corporations were substantively equivalent, the courts rejected the
government's argument that realization occurs in every exchange. The courts
did not focus on the fundamental change that had in fact occurred at the
shareholder level, namely, the dilution of historic ownership from 100

54. Weiss v. Steam, 285 F. 689, 692 (6th Cir. 1923) (citations omitted). The
District Court also acknowledged that its decision would not be guided by the form
of the transaction, but by its substance. Steam v. Weiss, No. 10126, p. 2 (N.D. Ohio,
1922), J. Westenhaver ("All counsel agree that the substance and not the form of the
transaction is controlling, and that the Court will and must look through the
machinery and verbiage in order to ascertain the true substance and nature of the
transaction.").
55. Steam, 265 U.S. at 254 ("[W]e must regard matters of substance and not
mere form.").
56. Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added).
57. The Court's language ("technical ownership of an enterprise") suggests
that a mere change in the legal entity that owns the enterprise, in the absence of other
meaningful changes, is insufficient for realization.
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percent to 50 percent. Instead of confronting this issue, the courts adopted a
fiction that camouflaged the resulting dilution.
C.

CourtsBypass DilutionIssue by Treating Sale of Halfof Proprietary
Interest as OccurringBefore Exchange of the Other Half

Notwithstanding that all three of the Steam courts rejected the
government's argument that the substitution of one corporation for another is
sufficient for realization, the courts concurred that the Old Acme
shareholders realized gain with respect to the half interest they sold for cash.
The courts also agreed that gain was not realized with respect to the New
Acme stock received by the Old Acme shareholders. The courts reached the
latter conclusion without confronting the fact that the New Acme shares
represented a significantly diluted ownership interest in the original
enterprise. The courts bypassed the dilution issue by bifurcating the Stearn
transaction into two sequential events: (1) a sale of 50 percent of the Old
Acme stock, followed by (2) the exchange of a 50 percent interest in Old
Acme for a 50 percent interest in New Acme. 58 By severing the sale from the
subsequent exchange, the courts viewed the subsequent exchange as a nondilutive transaction, i.e., one in which no change in the proportionate interest
of the Old Acme shareholders occurred.
1. The Fiction Employed by the Courts
The District Court articulated the two-step fiction as follows:
The real transaction was a sale by the stockholders
of the old company to. .. Eastman, Dillon & Company of a
one-half interest in their shares of stock and a reorganization
by the old stockholders and Eastman, Dillon & Company of
the corporation, the substance and legal effect of which was
to leave all stockholding interests and all the corporate assets
in precisely the same situation after the transactionwas fully
carriedout as it was when it was begun.59
This view enabled the District Court to avoid the question of whether the
dilution of a 100 percent ownership interest to a 50 percent interest triggers
realization. Instead of confronting the dilution issue, the court treated the
58. See Richard H. Tye, Reciprocal Mortgage Sales: A Question of
Realization, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 148 (1989) ('.'The Court bifurcated this
transaction, however, treating it in part as a sale of one share of the stock for cash,
and in part as an exchange of the other share for the same proportionate interest in
the new corporation.").
59. Dist. Ct. Opinion, Steam v. Weiss, No. 10126, p. 2 (N.D. Ohio 1922)
(emphasis added).
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cash as consideration for 50 percent of the Old Acme stock and severed that
cash purchase from a subsequent exchange of the remaining 50 percent of
the Old Acme stock for 50 percent of the New Acme stock.6 °
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court in an opinion that more
clearly treated the cash as consideration received for 50 percent of the Old
Acme stock in a purchase occurring before the exchange of the remaining 50
percent of the Old Acme stock for New Acme stock. The court stated,
Except for the change of corporate entity, there was
here a continuance of the same concern. The assets were the
same, and the stockholders (assuming the sale of the other
half to have been consummated) were the same, and in the
same proportions . . ).61
By "assuming" the sale of half of the Old Acme stock was consummated
before the subsequent exchange of shares, the court avoided the question of
whether the dilution of a 100 percent ownership interest to a 50 percent
interest triggers realization. As a result, the court concluded that the
subsequent exchange of the selling shareholders' remaining 50 percent of
Old Acme stock for New Acme stock resulted "in the same proportions" (a
50 percent interest in the enterprise both before and after the exchange).
The Supreme Court followed the Sixth Circuit's lead and articulated
the view that a sale of a 50 percent interest in Old Acme occurred before an
exchange of the remaining 50 percent interest in Old Acme for a 50 percent
interest in New Acme. In the words of the Court,
[T]he Collector ruled that each old stockholder sold his
entire holding, and assessed respondent accordingly for
resulting profits. Adopting a different view, the courts below
held that he really sold halffor cash and exchanged the
remainder,without gain, for the same proportionateinterest
in the transferred corporate assets and business. We agree
with the conclusion reached below. The practical result of
the things done was [1] a transfer of the old assets and
business ... to the new corporation, [2] a disposal for cash
by each stockholder of half his interest therein, and [3] an
60. This conclusion follows from the court's statement that all stockholding
interests were left "in precisely the same situation after the transaction was fully
carried out as it was when it was begun." For that statement to be true, the court
must have viewed the transaction as beginning after 50 percent of the Old Acme
stock was sold to the Purchasers. In that event, the Old Acme shareholders and the
Purchasers each owned 50 percent of the enterprise both before and after the
transaction. By contrast, if the transaction had been treated as beginning before the
sale of 50 percent of the Old Acme shares to the Purchasers, the transaction would

have reduced the Old Acme shareholders' interest from 100 percent to 50 percent.
61. Steam, 285 F. at 691 (emphasis added).
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exchange of the remainder for new stock representing the
same proportionateinterest in the enterprise."62

The Supreme Court, like the lower courts, treated a sale of 50
percent of the New Acme stock as occurring independently of, and prior to, a
subsequent exchange of the remaining 50 percent. This treatment enabled the
Court to conclude that the exchange results in no change in proportionate
interest. 63 Therefore, no realization occurred with respect to the 50 percent of
the Old Acme stock exchanged for 50 percent of the New Acme stock. As
the next section will demonstrate, the courts' fiction is inconsistent with the
substance of the transaction and an equally viable alternative fiction would
have exposed the dilution.
2. Critique of the Courts' Fiction

As demonstrated above, all three of the Stearn courts avoided the
corporate dilution issue by bifurcating the transaction into a sale of 50
percent of the Old Acme shares followed by an exchange of the remaining 50
percent of the Old Acme shares for 50 percent of the New Acme shares. By
isolating the second leg of the transaction, the courts concluded that the Old
Acme shareholders had the same proportionate interest before and after the
exchange. This two-step fiction, however, does not comport with the
substance of the transaction.
The substance of the transaction can be divined from the agreement
between the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, unless 80 percent of the Old
Acme shares were tendered, the proposed transaction was null and void.64
Thus, the essence of the transaction was a single, unified exchange of all the
Old Acme stock for New Acme stock and cash.65 In substance, therefore, the
62.

Steam, 265 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).

63.

As precedent for its holding, the Supreme Court cited Eisner v.

Macomber and other early cases in which assets were rearranged among whollyowned entities, but there were no changes with respect to the proportionate
ownership interests of the stockholders. See id. at 253-54, citing Towne v. Eisner,
245 U. S. 418 (1918); Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330
(1918); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 (1918). Based on these
cases, the Court determined that precedent existed for ignoring the separate nature of
two distinct legal corporate entities where the two corporations are substantially
identical.
64. Statement of Agreed Facts, supra note 33, at Exhibit A, p. 1, 1 ("This
contract is made upon the express condition, that it shall not become operative
unless, on or before December 1, A.D. 1916, at least eighty per centum (80%) of the
entire outstanding common capital stock of said Company is deposited hereunder for
sale, in accordance with the terms hereof, with said depositary.").
65. The fact that delivery of the New Acme shares to the sellers was
delayed several months does not undermine the view that 100 percent of the stock of
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transaction resulted in the dilution of a 100 percent equity interest to a 50
percent equity interest-a dramatic change in the nature of the property that
should not have been ignored. Nothing in the agreement implies that the
shareholders of Old Acme intended to sell 50 percent of their Old Acme
shares and that the transaction could have ended at that point.
Even if one entertained the idea of bifurcating the transaction into
two distinct parts, that approach need not have camouflaged the significant
dilution that resulted from the transaction. The courts could have adopted an
equally viable fiction that would have exposed the dilution that resulted from
the transaction. Neither one of these two fictional approaches is superior to
the other nor can either approach be validated because the financial
intermediary gathered all the consideration and distributed it to the relevant
parties after the assets were transferred.6 6 Use of the intermediary makes it
impossible to discern whether the buyers acquired an initial stake in Old
Acme (under the Court's fiction) or New Acme (under the alternative
fiction). Thus, no justification exists for choosing the particular fiction that
the courts adopted.
The two alternative fictions are summarized as follows:
I. The Courts' Fiction: Purchasers Buy 50 Percent of
Old Acme Before Old Acme Shareholders Exchange
Remaining 50 Percent of Old Acme for 50 Percent of New
Acme.
All three Stearn courts bifurcated the transaction in a manner that
treated the Old Acme shareholders as selling 50 percent of the Old Acme
stock before the subsequent asset sale and liquidation of Old Acme. If the
transaction had actually been structured in this manner, the following three
consecutive steps would have occurred:
1. Purchasers buy 50 percent of Old Acme stock from Old Acme
shareholders for $7.5 million;
2. Old Acme transfers all its assets to New Acme for 100 percent of
New Acme stock;
3. Old Acme liquidates distributing 50 percent of New Acme stock
to original Old Acme shareholders and 50 percent of New Acme
stock to Purchasers.
As discussed above, the substance of the transaction does not support
treating each of the steps as independent events. If, however, the steps were
regarded as independent, the shareholders of Old Acme would have owned
Old Acme had been transferred to Depositary before the reorganization was
effectuated. Order on Findings of Fact, supra note 38, at, p. 5 (noting that Cleveland
was to hold on to one-half of the New Acme stock until May 31, 1917, unless the
Purchasers consented to an earlier disbursement, at which time the stock would then
be transferred to the Old Acme shareholders).
66. See supra Part II.A.
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50 percent of Old Acme immediately before their interest was converted to a
50 percent interest in New Acme as a result of the liquidation. Hence, no
dilution would have occurred.
II. An Equally Viable Fiction: Purchasers Buy 50
percent of New Acme Before Old Acme Shareholders
Exchange 100 percent of Old Acme for 50 percent of New
Acme and Cash.
In lieu of the courts' approach, the transaction could have been
bifurcated by treating the Purchasers as buying a 50 percent interest in New
Acme before Old Acme's subsequent asset sale and liquidation. If the
transaction had been structured in this manner, the following three
consecutive steps would have occurred:
1. Purchasers buy 50 percent of New Acme stock from New Acme
for $7.5 million;
2. Old Acme transfers all its assets to New Acme for $7.5 million
and 50 percent of New Acme stock;
3. Old Acme liquidates distributing $7.5 million and 50 percent of
New Acme stock to Old Acme shareholders in exchange for 100
percent of Old Acme stock.
Commentators and the IRS have actually adopted this alternative
67
fiction. Even the Supreme Court in Stearn lapsed into the view that the
Purchasers bought into New Acme before the asset sale and liquidation. The
Court stated, "The sale of part of the new stock and distribution of the
proceeds did not affect the nature of the unsold portion; when distributed this
did not in truth represent any gain." 6 8 By stating that the "proceeds" from the
sale of part of the New Acme stock were "distributed," the Court implies the
following: (1) the Purchasers bought New Acme shares before New Acme
67. See, e.g., David F. Shores, Reexamining Continuity of Shareholder
Interest in Corporate Reorganizations, 17 VA. TAX REV. 419, 434 (1998) ("In
[Steam], all of the assets of Old Corporation (a manufacturing company), were

transferred to New Corporation. New Corporation also received an infusion of cash
from an investment company, in exchange for half of its common stock. The
remaining half of the new corporation stock plus the cash received from the
investment company were distributedto the shareholders of Old Corporation, and

Old Corporation was dissolved.") (emphasis added); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., A
General Theory of F Reorganizations, 137 TAX NOTES 1193, 1205 (2012)

[hereinafter Cummings, A General Theory] ("In Weiss, the Supreme Court held that
no realization occurred when one corporation actually transferred its assets to a new
corporation with a different name for its stock and cash contributed to it by new
investors and liquidated, giving the original shareholders half the new corporation's
stock and the cash."); T.A.M. 1995-15-003 (April 14,1995) ("Weiss v. Steam
involved a corporate reorganization where a corporation sold its assets to new
corporation in exchange for 50% of the stock in the new corporation and cash.").
68. Steam, 265 U.S. at 254 (emphasis added).
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purchased the Old Acme assets; (2) New Acme used the cash and the other
half of the New Acme stock to fund the asset purchase; and (3) half of the
New Acme stock and the cash were distributed to the Old Acme
shareholders in liquidation of Old Acme. By contrast, if the Court had been
true to the fiction it adopted, no "distribution" of the cash by Old Acme
could have occurred because the cash would never have entered corporate
solution. Rather, the cash would have been paid directly to the Old Acme
shareholders. Thus, even the Supreme Court in Steam was complicit in
conceptualizing the transaction in a way that makes it impossible to ignore
69
the dilution.
In sum, the Steam transaction substantially diluted the taxpayers'
interests. The Supreme Court held that the gain with respect to the 50 percent
retained interest was not realized. The Court did not address the question of
whether the significant change in the nature of the retained interest should
have triggered a realization event. Because the Court ignored the dilution
issue, the Stearn jurisprudence sheds no light on the question of whether
dilution can trigger realization.
III.

EVOLUTION OF THE REALIZATION REQUIREMENT:
A PATHWAY TO TAXING DILUTIVE TRANSACTIONS

Although significant dilution resulted from the transaction in Weiss
v. Steam, the courts refrained from confronting the question of whether
dilution should trigger realization. During the past century, the common law
of realization evolved significantly from its primitive state when the Steam
transaction occurred in 1916. That evolution facilitates treating the Steam
transaction and certain other dilutive transactions as realization events under
69. A third alternative fiction would have been to bifurcate the transaction
by treating Old Acme's sale of assets and liquidation as occurring before the
Purchasers purchased an interest in New Acme. Under this fiction, the following
consecutive three steps would have occurred: (1) Old Acme transfers all of its assets
to New Acme for 100 percent of the New Acme stock; (2) Old Acme liquidates
distributing all the New Acme stock to the Old Acme shareholders; and (3)
Purchasers buy 50 percent of the New Acme stock from the Old Acme shareholders.
In this situation, the shareholders of Old Acme would have owned 100 percent of
Old Acme immediately before their interest was converted to a 100 percent interest
in New Acme as a result of the liquidation, and no dilution would have occurred.
The fact that both sellers and buyers were to incorporate New Acme undermines the
view that Purchasers bought half of the New Acme stock before Old Acme
transferred its assets to New Acme. See Order on Findings of Fact, supra note 38, at
pp. 3-4, 4 ("Purchasers and Vendors will cause to be incorporated under the laws
of the state of Ohio a manufacturing corporation."); Id. ("Purchasers and Vendors ..
. will cause . . . [New Acme] to purchase all the property and assets . . . of [Old
Acme] .... ").
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current law. Part III examines the evolution of the realization requirement
during the past century.
A.

1920: Eisner v. Macomber-Realizationas a Constitutional
Mandate

Between the time of the Steam transaction and the time the courts
rendered their decisions, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of
Eisner v. Macomber."° The Macomber Court determined that a pro rata stock
dividend was not taxable as income under the 16th Amendment. 7 1 According
to the Court, a stock dividend is not taxable as income when it does not
increase the proportionate interests of the shareholders, takes nothing from
72
the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the stockholders.
Because the new stock is simply different evidence of the accumulation of
profits and increase in capital, the Court held that the stockholder "has not
73
realized or received any income in the transaction.
The Macomber Court treated realization as a constitutional
requirement. As the Court stated, the "essential matter" for determining
whether there is income is to ask whether there is a gain, a profit, something
of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, severed from the
capital, however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'--that
is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use,
74
benefit, and disposal-that is income derived from property.
Therefore, because the stock dividend in Macomber was simply a
representation of the shareholder's portion of accumulated profits and was
capital, not income, the stock dividend was not properly taxable under the
16th Amendment. 75 Two decades later, the Court departed from its view that
a severance from capital was a prerequisite to realization and acknowledged
that realization was essentially an administrative mechanism.

70.

252 U.S. 189 (1920).

71.

Id. at 219.

72.
73.

Id.
at 212.
Id.
Id.at 207. In defining income, the Court emphasized the necessity that

74.
gain be severed from capital but did not tie severance to an actual sale or exchange
of property.
75. The Steam Court focused on this language and found that the requisite
separation of income from capital had not occurred in Steam. "We cannot conclude
that mere change for purposes of reorganization in the technical ownership of an
enterprise, under circumstances like those here disclosed, followed by issuance of
new certificates constitutes gain separated from the original capital interest." Weiss
v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
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1940: Bruun
Mechanism

B.

and Horst-Realization as

an Administrative

In Helvering v. Brun, a landlord and a tenant entered into a 99-year
lease of land and a building. 76 The tenant demolished the original building
and constructed a new building on the property that increased the value of
the leased property. 7 7 The tenant eventually defaulted on the lease, and the
landlord recovered the land and the new building. 78 The Government argued
that the recovery of the leased premises was a realization event, and thus, the
landlord was taxed on the increase in the value of the property resulting from
the construction of the building. 79 The Supreme Court agreed that a
realization event occurred, stating as follows:
While it is true that economic gain is not always
taxable as income, it is settled that the realization of gain
need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset ....
The fact that the gain is a portion of the value of property
received by the taxpayer in the transaction does not negative
its realization . . . .It is not necessary to recognition of
taxable gain that [the taxpayer] should be able to sever the
improvement ...from his original capital.8 °
The Bruun decision significantly relaxed the realization requirement.
As two respected commentators have noted, "Although the Bruun opinion
did not reject the famous definition promulgated by Eisner v. Macomber, it
watered down the requirement of a realization by suggesting that any definite
be employed as the
event - here the forfeiture of a leasehold - could properly
81
gain."
taxpayer's
the
of
occasion for taking account
Shortly after the Bruun decision, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that realization was based on administrative convenience. In Helvering v.
Horst, a taxpayer who owned a coupon bond gratuitously transferred one of
the interest coupons to a child shortly before the due date of the interest
payment. 82 The child collected the interest and it was reported on the child's
tax return. 83 The government claimed the interest income was attributable to
76. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 464 (1940).
77. Id.at 464.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 464-65.
80. Id.at 469. The holding of Helvering v. Bruun was subsequently
overruled by Congress. See I.R.C. § 109 (excluding from the lessor's income
improvements made by the lessee on the lessor's property).
BORRIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
81.
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 5.1 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter BITTKER & LOKKEN].

82.
83.

Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940).
Id. at 13l.
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the parent who presumably paid tax at a higher rate than the child. 84 The
Supreme Court agreed with the government that the taxpayer could not
escape taxation on the interest that accrued while he owned the underlying
bond and stated that the realization rule was "founded on administrative
convenience." 85 The Court subsequently reaffirmed this view of the
86
realization requirement.
Bruun and Horst treated realization essentially as an administrative
mechanism that facilitates terminating the artificial deferral it confers at the
earliest convenient time. 87 The movement away from treating realization as a
84. Id. at 114.
85. Id.at 116.
86. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v.Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) ("[T]he
concept of realization is'founded on administrative convenience."').
87. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
5.01 (12th ed. 2012) ("[R]ealization isstrictly an administrative rule
TAXATION
and not a constitutional, much less an economic requirement, of 'income."); Stanley
S.Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of
the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. NW. U. 779, 791 (1941) ("[T]he formalistic
doctrine of realization proclaimed by [Eisner v. Macomber] is not a constitutional
mandate."). But see Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 58 (1993)
("'[T]he reports of [the constitutional realization requirement's] death have been
greatly exaggerated.'
Although undermined by commentary and the dicta of
decisions like Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner, realization as a
constitutional principle, while perhaps lethargic, subsists."). It remains debatable as
to whether Congress could mandate a mark-to-market tax system that brings asset
appreciation into the tax base merely because of such appreciation. But even those
who maintain a constitutional prohibition on a mark-to-market tax system exists
concede that the presence of some meaningful event other than a sale or exchange is
sufficient to trigger realization.
See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Should Share
Repurchases Be Dividends to Remaining Holders?, 144 TAX NOTES 175, 179 (2014)
[hereinafter Hariton, Should Share Repurchases] ("[T]he majority's opinion in
Eisner v. Macomber... did not forbid Congress to recast the form of a transaction
that has real economic consequences in a manner that gives rise to taxable receipts. It
merely held that Congress cannot tax receipts - deemed or otherwise- arising from a
transaction that does nothing at all as an economic matter . . . . But clearly, the
Constitution does allow Congress to recast the form of a transaction that has
economic consequences for a taxpayer and tax the resulting deemed receipts as
income."); Gene Magidenko, Is a Broadly Based Mark-to-Market Tax
Unconstitutional?, 143 TAX NOTES 952, 954 (2014) [hereinafter Magidenko, Is a
Broadly Based] ("The Supreme Court's precedent suggests that a property tax is
direct [and subject to apportionment] only if it is a levy on property purely because
of its ownership. If the tax attaches because of some action, exchange or change in
circumstance, then it is an excise and indirect, subject only to the geographical
uniformity requirement of the Constitution.") (emphasis added); Erik M. Jensen, The
Constitutionalityof a Mark-to-Market Taxing System, 43 TAX NOTES 1299, 1299 n.
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constitutional requirement accommodates the view that events other than an
actual sale or exchange can trigger realization. As Professor Stone stated, "It
appears that the Court now considers the realization requirement satisfied by
any tangible, identifiable event that marks an occasion for acknowledging

that the taxpayer's property has increased in value, even if the taxpayer has
88
not extracted his gain from his original investment."
Now that realization is no longer the workhorse that it was when
Stearn was decided, 89 the Supreme Court has paved the way for treating
dilutive transactions as realization events. Moreover, two subsequent
developments further facilitate that result.
C.

1991: Cottage Savings-Realizationas a Substantive Concept

The Supreme Court revisited its Stearn decision in 1991 when it

90
confronted the essence of realization in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner.

The Cottage Savings Court blithely followed its predecessor by parroting the
view that the transaction in Stearn did not result in a change in the
shareholders' proportionate interests.9' Thus, the Cottage Savings Court
showed no greater awareness of the significant shareholder dilution that
occurred in the Steam transaction. However, the Cottage Savings Court
clarified the essence of realization and, in doing so, further set the stage for
treating certain dilutive transactions as realization events.
Cottage Savings addressed the question of whether a savings
association realized a loss after engaging in an "R-49 transaction" sanctioned
by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Specifically, the savings
association swapped its portfolio of mortgage interests in single family
homes for a new portfolio of "substantially similar" (according to the
FHLBB) mortgage interests in other single family homes located in the same
municipal area. 92 The value of the original mortgages had dramatically
6 (2014) [hereinafter Jensen, The Constitutionalityof Mark-to-Market] ("What rises
to the level of a realization event can be an issue in some circumstances, but, by
anyone's definition, a mark-to-market system does not require realization.").
88. Richard B. Stone, Back to Fundamentals:Another Version of the Stock
Dividend Saga, 79 COLUM. L REv. 898, 919 (1979) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Stone, Back to Fundamentals].
89. See Richard L. Bacon & Harold L. Adrion, Taxable Events: The
Aftermath of Cottage Savings (PartI), 59 TAx NOTES 1227, 1245 (1993) [hereinafter
Bacon, Taxable Events, Part1] ("[C]ommon law principles .. .made it increasingly
easy to find a realization event.").
90. Cottage Sav. Ass'n. v. Commissioner., 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
91. Id.at 564 ("In each case [including Weiss v. Steam], . .
the
stockholders of the old corporation received shares in the new corporation equal to
their proportional interests in the old corporation.").
92. Id. at 557-58.
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declined due to an interest rate surge and the savings association hoped to
claim a tax loss without recording an economic loss on its books. 93 The
Commissioner argued that a loss was not realized because the properties
exchanged, namely the mortgage participation interests, were not "materially
different" and, therefore, disallowed the deduction of the loss. 94 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner's argument that an exchange
of property triggers a realization "event" only if the exchanged properties are
"materially different." 95 But the Court held that the material difference
requirement was met in this case (and the losses were realized for tax
purposes) because the mortgages at issue were made to different obligors and
96
secured by different homes.
The threshold question faced by the Cottage Savings Court was
whether realization requires that the properties exchanged be "materially
different" from one another. 97 Although the Code had never delineated a
material difference requirement for realization, the regulations had imposed
that requirement since 1934.98 In addition, the Court determined that such a
requirement could be inferred from its early corporate reorganization
jurisprudence that included Steam. 99 According to the Court, Weiss v.
Steam, 100 United States v. Phellis,0 1 Marr v. United States, 102 and Eisner v.

Macomber 10 3 made up the "contemporary legal context" in which Congress
enacted the statutory rules governing realization that originated in 1924.104
These cases acknowledged a "'materially' or 'essentially' different
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 559-60.
Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 560.

98. Id. at 560-61 ("The Commissioner himself has by regulation construed §
1001(a) to embody a material difference requirement .... ). See Treas. Reg. 86, Art.
I 1l-I (Revenue Act of 1934) ("[T]he Act regards as income or loss sustained, the
gain or loss realized from ... the exchange of property for other property differing
materially either in kind or extent."). The current regulation reads as follows: "[T]he
gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange
of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is

treated as income or as loss sustained." Reg. § 1.1001 - 1(a) (emphasis added).
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 561-62.
265 U.S. 242 (1924).
257 U.S. 156 (1921).
268 U.S. 536 (1925).

103. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
104. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner., 499 U.S. at 562. The Revenue
Act of 1924 was enacted on June 2, 1924, a few days after the Court decided Steam
(May 26, 1924) and before the Court decided Marr (June 1, 1925). Thus, these
decisions could not have influenced the 1924 Act.
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requirement" for realization. 10 5 In addition, Congress left the "principles of
realization" from these cases untouched throughout subsequent enactments
of the Code.'° 6 Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress presumably
07
intended to codify the cases' principles in the Code. 1
After confirming the existence of a material difference requirement,
the Cottage Savings Court proceeded to the question of what constitutes a
"material difference." The Court acknowledged the dearth of guidance on
this question and opted to rely on its early corporate restructuring
decisions. 108 Once again, the Court focused on Macomber, Phellis, Marr,

and Steam. 10 9 The Court found that the latter three cases "refined
Macomber's conception of realization in the context of property
exchanges.""10 The Court initially identified the similarities in the three
cases. Specifically, "in each case, the corporation in which the taxpayer held
stock had reorganized into a new corporation, with the new corporation
assuming the business of the old corporation."i'I More significantly, the
Court stated as follows.
In each case, following the reorganization, the
stockholders of the old corporation received shares in the
new corporation equal to their proportional interest in the

old corporation.The question in these cases was whether the
taxpayers realized the accumulated gain in their shares in the
old corporation when they received in returnfor those shares
stock representingan equivalent proportionalinterest in the
2
new corporation.1

As a result of these purported similarities, the Court ultimately differentiated
Phellis and Marr, which held that realization occurred, from Steam, which
held that no realization occurred. Specifically, in Phellis and Marr, the old
and new corporations were incorporated in different states, but in Stearn, the
old and new corporations were incorporated in the same state. 113
105. Id. at 561-62.
106. Id. at 562.
107. Id. at 561-62.
108. Id.at 563 ("To give meaning to the material difference test, we must
look to the case law from which the test derives and which we believe Congress
intended to codify in enacting and reenacting the language that now comprises §
1001(a).").
109. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 563-65.
110. Id. at 563.
111. Id.at564.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.("As we explained in Marr, our determination that the reorganized
company in Weiss was not 'really different' from its predecessor turned on the fact
that both companies were incorporated in the same State.").
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Quite clearly, the requirement that an identical proportionate interest
be received to escape realization represented a fundamental element of the
Cottage Savings Court's test for not finding a material difference. The Court
summed up its analysis as follows:
Taken together, Phellis, Marr, and Weiss stand for
the principle that properties are "different" in the sense that
is "material" to the Internal Revenue Code so long as their
respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are
different in kind or extent. Thus, separate groups of stock are
not materially different if they confer "the same
proportional interests of the same character in the same
corporation." However, they are materially different if they
are issued by different corporations or if they confer
"different rights and powers" in the same corporation. 114
The Cottage Savings Court might be criticized for erroneously
stating that the shareholders' proportional interests did not change in Steam.
But the Cottage Savings Court apparently never reexamined the facts of
Steam. Instead, it simply restated that Court's conclusion that the transaction
did not change the proportional interests of the shareholders. Because the
Cottage Savings Court failed to acknowledge the reduction in proportionate
interest in Steam, Cottage Savings fails to offer any additional insight into
how a shift in proprietary interest impacts realization. To date, the Supreme
Court has bypassed the question of whether corporate dilution should trigger
realization.
After Cottage Savings, the principal prerequisite to realization is
satisfaction of the material difference requirement. The Cottage Savings
Court made it clear that no material difference exists when the proportional
interests of the shareholders remain the same before and after a corporate
transaction. Part IV explores how much of a change in proportionate interest
must occur to satisfy the material difference standard. But first, the final
element on the path to taxing dilutive transactions will be addressed.
D.

1996: "Deemed Exchange" Regulations-A Substance Over Form
Element of Realization

Steam and Cottage Savings both involved an actual exchange of
property. In Steam, the shareholders of Old Acme transferred all their shares
for shares of New Acme and cash. The Supreme Court held that no
realization event occurred because the properties exchanged were not
materially different (based on the faulty premise that the original
shareholders retained the same proportionate interest in the enterprise). 115 In
114. Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
115. See supra Part II.
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Cottage Savings, the savings and loan institutions transferred a basket of
mortgages in exchange for a basket of different mortgages. The Supreme
Court held that a realization event occurred because the property received in
1 16
the exchange was materially different from the property surrendered.'
Steam illustrates that dilution can result from an actual exchange of
property. In many if not most cases, however, dilution results from a
transaction that does not entail a physical transfer of the diluted interest. For
example, a sole shareholder might sell 99 percent of her stock to a third party
thereby diluting her interest to one percent. In this situation, the powers
associated with the one percent retained interest differ dramatically from
those of the original 100 percent interest. Owning 100 percent of an
enterprise gives the owner complete control over every business decision. By
contrast, the ownership of a one percent interest in the same enterprise
provides the owner with basic rights and obligations under corporate law but
rarely enables the owner to influence any significant business decision. Thus,
although the shareholder did not physically transfer the retained one percent
interest, the sale can be regarded as effectuating a "deemed exchange" of the
"old" 100 percent interest for the "new" one percent interest. 117
Prior to Cottage Savings, the IRS ruled in a different context that a
significant change in one's property rights can result in a deemed exchange
that triggers a realization event. In a 1987 revenue ruling, the holder of a
bond who was entitled to a higher rate of interest under an interest
18
adjustment clause waived its right to receive the higher rate of interest.
The IRS ruled that the holder's action "represents a material change in the
terms of the bonds and results in a taxable exchange under section 1001 of
the Code and a deemed issuance of new bonds." Similarly, a 1989 ruling
involved two situations; one in which a debtor and a creditor agreed to
reduce the interest rate on a sovereign debt and the other in which a debtor
and a creditor agreed to reduce the stated principal amount.1 1 9 In both
situations, the IRS ruled that "the modification [of the obligation] results in a
deemed exchange of the original obligation for the modified obligation under
section 1001 of the Code. [The creditor] may realize and recognize a gain or
loss on each exchange . .

.

.The modified obligation is treated as a newly

issued debt instrument for federal income tax purposes."'2 0 In both rulings,
116. See supra Part III.C.
117. The sale of 99 percent of the stock potentially triggers two realization

events. The first realization event is the actual sale of a 99 percent interest. The
second realization event is the "deemed exchange" of a 100 percent ownership
interest for a one percent interest. Both realization events are triggered by the sale of
99 percent of the stock; hence, they occur simultaneously.
118. Rev. Rul. 87-19, 1987-1 C.B. 249.
119. Rev. Rul. 89-122, 1989-2 C.B. 200.
120. Id.at 201.
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the holder of the debt instrument did not physically transfer the original debt
instrument. Rather, the terms of an obligation were modified and the
resulting change in the nature of the obligation triggered a realization event,
notwithstanding the absence of an actual transfer of the old obligation.
The Cottage Savings decision potentially expanded this deemed
exchange concept beyond the modification of a debt instrument."' z As two
commentators remarked:
[T]he question... is what principle Cottage Savings stands
for - whether . . . it creates a "new" tax threshold for
realization events lower than many believe exists under
current law. The special concern is with the tax. test for
determining when changes in the terms of bonds, other debt
instruments, and similar contract and property rights,
without execution22 of an entirely new agreement, are
realization events. 1
Congress and the courts have yet to address the extent to which a change in
"property rights" is sufficient to trigger realization in the absence of a
physical surrender of property. However, the Cottage Savings decision
served as a springboard for the Treasury Department to formalize and expand
its position with respect to this issue in the context of modified debt
instruments.
In 1996, the Treasury Department invoked the Cottage Savings
decision when it promulgated regulations delineating when the modification
of the terms of a debt instrument results in a deemed exchange that triggers a
121. The common law prior to Cottage Savings neither supports nor
undermines the view that modifying the legal rights associated with a property
interest can result in a deemed exchange and trigger a realization event. A plethora
of case law addresses the converse situation; namely, whether an actual exchange of
substantively similar property might not trigger a realization event. See, e.g., Emery
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding that an exchange of bonds
with different interest rates, maturity dates and call periods constituted a realization
event); W. Mo. Power Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 105 (1952) (holding that
exchange of defaulted bonds for refunding bonds did not trigger a realization event);
Mutual Loan & Savings Co. v. Commssioner, 184 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1950) (holding
that exchange of refunded bonds for original bonds did not trigger realization event);
Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 166 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding that
surrender of old bonds not in default for new bonds with modified terms triggered
realization event). The courts, however, have not addressed the question of whether a
significant modification to retained property might result in a deemed exchange that
triggers a realization event.
122. Bacon, Taxable Events, Part1, supra note 89, at 1229 (1993) (Emphasis
added.). See Gregory E. Steam, Tax Aspects Of RestructuringFinancially Troubled
Businesses, 541-4th TAx MGMT. PORT. (BNA) A-34 (2009) ("The Supreme Court
may have lowered the judicial threshold at which a disposition was deemed to occur
in Cottage Savings .... ).
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realization event.12 3 Under the regulations, if a debt instrument is
"significantly modified," the holder is treated as exchanging the original debt
instrument "for a modified instrument that differs materially either in kind or
extent."' 12 4 In these circumstances, a realization event occurs. Much criticism
has been directed at these regulations but no indication exists that the
regulations exceed the Treasury's authority to promulgate interpretive
regulations. 125
The current state of the law on deemed exchanges is undeveloped.
Based on the evolution of the realization requirement and the Cottage
Savings decision, however, a physical transfer of property should not always
' 126
be necessary for realization to occur. If a "tangible, identifiable event"
changes the nature of a property interest and the modified interest is
materially different from its predecessor, the holder should be treated as
exchanging the original property for new property. Under these
circumstances, a realization event would occur, notwithstanding the absence
of a physical transfer of property.
As Part III demonstrates, subsequent to the Steam transaction, the
common law of realization has evolved in a manner that significantly
liberalized the realization requirement. These developments accommodate
the view that certain dilutive transactions are realization events. Part IV
explores when dilution should trigger realization under current law and how
Congress should rationalize the treatment of this issue.

123. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3. See also Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3, 57 Fed. Reg.
57034-1 (1992) ("Cottage [Savings] did not involve the modification of an
instrument, but an actual exchange between holders. Questions have arisen,
however, concerning the Court's interpretation of the material difference standard
and its possible application to modifications of debt instruments by issuers and
holders .... In response to the issues raised by the Cottage [Savings] decision, and
in an effort to provide certainty, the Service proposes to expand the regulations
under section 1001 of the Code to deal explicitly with the modification of debt
instruments.").
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(b). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-3(c)
(definition of "modification"), -3(e) (definition of "significant modification").
125. See I.R.C. § 7805(a). See also Richard L. Bacon & Harold L. Adrion,
Taxable Events: The Aftermath of Cottage Savings (Part II), 59 TAX NOTES 1385,
1386 (1993) [hereinafter Bacon, Taxable Events, Part II] ("Virtually all the
comments focus on the collateral effects of finding that a realization event has
occurred rather than on the soundness of treating specific events as 'triggers' for
realization events in the first instance.").
126. Stone, Back to Fundamentals,supra note 88, at 919.
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WHEN SHOULD CORPORATE DILUTION TRIGGER REALIZATION?

In Weiss v. Steam, the Supreme Court should have addressed
whether an exchange that dilutes a shareholder's proprietary interest
constitutes a realization event. As demonstrated in Part II, the Court
bypassed the dilution issue by artificially dividing the transaction into two
discrete parts that effectively eliminated the dilution. As discussed in Part III,
the realization requirement was significantly liberalized subsequent to
Steam. Thus, a fresh look at the question of whether dilution should trigger
realization is desirable. Part IV explores the circumstances in which a
dilutive transaction should trigger realization under current law.
A.

An Exchange That Dilutes a Majority Interest to a Minority Interest
Should Normally TriggerRealization

In Steam, the shareholders of Old Acme transferred all the stock of
Old Acme for shares of New Acme and cash.' 2 7 The fact that the
shareholders transferred all their shares would normally have been sufficient
to trigger realization of each shareholder's gain or loss. But two elements of
the transaction raised doubts about whether realization occurred. First,
although a new corporate entity replaced the old one, the corporate enterprise
remained substantively the same because the contents of Old Acme and New
Acme were identical. Second, the legal rights and obligations associated with
the stock issued by New Acme were the same as those associated with the
stock of Old Acme because both entities were incorporated in the same state.
The only change that occurred with respect to the Old Acme shareholders
was the dilution of their proprietary interests from 100 percent to 50 percent,
an effect that the courts ignored by bifurcating the transaction. The question,
therefore, is whether the dilution that resulted from the Stearn exchange is
sufficient to trigger realization under current law.
According to the Cottage Savings Court, an exchange of property
does not automatically trigger realization because the common law dictates
that the property received in the exchange must be "materially different"
from the property surrendered for a realization event to occur. 128 Under this
standard, "properties are 'different' in the sense that is 'material' to the
Internal Revenue Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal
entitlements that are different in kind or extent."' 12 9 As an example, the Court
stated,
[S]eparate groups of stock are not materially different if they
confer "the same proportional interest of the same character
127. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242,251-52 (1924).
128. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner., 499 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1991).
129. Id. at 565.
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in the same corporation." However, they are materially
different if they are issued by different corporations, or if
they confer "differen[t] rights and powers" in the same
30
corporation. 1
As two commentators have remarked, "Under this formalistic interpretation,
the vast majority of exchanges trigger realization when anything other than
13 1
identical properties are transferred."'
In Steam, the owners of Old Acme surrendered 100 percent
ownership for 50 percent of the stock of New Acme and cash.' 3 2 The
resulting change in ownership is significant because it entailed a shift from
complete control by the Old Acme shareholders to shared ownership with the
purchasers of the 50 percent interest. The legal entitlements associated with
100 percent of the stock of Old Acme may not have differed in "kind" from
those associated with the 50 percent of New Acme stock issued to the Old
Acme shareholders in light of the corporate level equivalence of the two
enterprises and the fact that both corporations were incorporated in the same
state. But the Old Acme shareholders' ownership of 50 percent of New
Acme relative to their ownership of 100 percent of Old Acme clearly
represents a difference in the "extent" of the legal entitlements they enjoyed.
Even a layperson would likely conclude that a 50 percent interest in a
business enterprise is dramatically different from 100 percent ownership of a
substantively equivalent enterprise.
To demonstrate that the dilution of a 100 percent equity interest to a
50 percent interest constitutes a material difference in a same state,
reincorporation transaction under current law, it is instructive to begin the
analysis with a more extreme example. Assume that Steam was the sole
shareholder of Old Acme and that he exchanged 100 percent of the stock of
Old Acme for one percent of the stock of New Acme and cash. Quite clearly,
stock representing ownership of 100 percent of a business is dramatically
different from stock representing one percent of the same business. Owning
100 percent of an enterprise gives the owner complete control over every
business decision. By contrast, the ownership of a one percent interest in the
same enterprise rarely enables the owner to influence any significant
business decision. In rare cases, facts may exist where a sole shareholder
whose interest is diluted to one percent can continue to exert significant
influence and the question of whether a material difference exists might be a

130. Id. (Citations omitted).
13 1. Rodney P. Mock & Jeffrey Tolin, Realization and Its Evil Twin Deemed
Realization, 31 VA. TAX REV. 573, 603-04 (2012) [hereinafter Mock & Tolin,
Realization].
132. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1924).
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close one. 133 But in all other cases, the dramatic differences that exist
between a one percent interest and a 100 percent interest should satisfy the
material difference standard delineated in Cottage Savings.
An equally compelling case can be made that the Old Acme stock
and the New Acme stock are materially different even if less than 99 percent
dilution had occurred in the previous example. If Steam had been the sole
shareholder of Old Acme and he exchanged all of his Old Acme stock for ten
percent of the stock of New Acme and cash, Steam would likely have
sacrificed as much control by surrendering a 90 percent interest as when he
surrendered a 99 percent interest. The same is true if Steam emerged with a
20 percent interest in New Acme or even as much as a 49.9 percent interest
in New Acme. In all cases where a 100 percent ownership interest in a
corporation is converted to a minority interest, the consequent loss of control
is likely to render the New Acme interest materially different from the Old
Acme interest.3 4 Exceptional cases will likely exist. 135 Nevertheless, in the
typical situation where majority ownership is surrendered, the loss of control
should satisfy the material difference standard and thereby trigger realization
136
with respect to the shareholder's entire interest in Old Acme.
133.

For example, if two unrelated parties each own 49.5 percent of the stock

of a corporation, the one percent shareholder might exercise considerable influence
on any issue with respect to which the two principal shareholders disagree.
134. See Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 897, 936 n. 188 (2010) ("In a closely held corporation, a large minority
shareholder can have absolutely no control if there is a majority shareholder."). In
the case of a publicly traded corporation, however, a large minority interest might be
able to exercise control influencing the election of the directors. The main focus of
this Article is on closely held corporations.
135. For example, a shareholder who owns 49.9 percent of the stock might
exercise significant control if the other 50.1 percent of the stock is divided among a
large group of shareholders. In that situation, the 49.9 percent shareholder could
align with one of the minority shareholders and the two together could control most
business decisions.
136. See Gwendolyn Griffith, Realization and Recognition of Losses on
Stock Surrenders: A Frolic Through Subchapter C, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49, 68
(1989) [hereinafter Griffith, Realization and Recognition] ("In the close corporation
context, . . . control through stock ownership may be crucial to continued
employment, compensation packages and other benefits arrangements."); Alan R.
Plamiter, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: CORPORATIONS, 125-126 (7th ed., 2012)
("Shareholders who own a majority of the shares can exercise their voting power to
elect the board, giving these owners virtually unfettered control of the business ....
For minority shareholders in a close corporation, voting rights are normally not a
meaningful protection."); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action
for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 703 (1993) ("The majority may even be able to
deny the minority shareholder any return in the long run by siphoning off corporate
assets in the form of high salaries or rents, insulated from judicial review by the
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Unlike the prior discussion, the transaction in Steam did not involve
more than 50 percent dilution, it involved exactly 50 percent dilution. To
approach the fact pattern in that case, assume that Steam was the sole
shareholder of Old Acme and that he exchanged 100 percent of the stock of
Old Acme for 50 percent of the stock of New Acme and cash. If Steam
retained a 50 percent interest, he would likely have been in a stronger
position than if he had only retained a minority interest. Unlike a minority
owner, a 50 percent owner can normally block any action of the others.
Nevertheless, when a 50 percent interest is compared to a 100 percent
interest, fundamental differences still exist. In contrast to a sole shareholder,
the holder of a 50 percent interest cannot take any unilateral action.
Therefore, even 50 percent dilution should normally render the 50 percent
interest in New Acme to be materially different from the 100 percent interest
trigger realization with respect to the entire
in Old Acme and, therefore,
13 7
Acme.
Old
in
interest
The foregoing hypothetical differs from Weiss v. Steam because
Steam was not the sole shareholder of Old Acme. Rather, a shareholder
group owned 100 percent of Old Acme and that group received 50 percent of
the stock of New Acme in the exchange. The existence of group ownership
of Old Acme diminishes the potential control that these shareholders could
exercise. As a practical matter, if different views existed within the group,
the group may not have been capable of exercising control either before or
after the dilution. Here again, the facts of each case will determine whether
the Old Acme shareholders could exercise control at any point in time.
Nevertheless, in light of the low threshold for finding a material difference
with respect to exchanged property, 138 the surrender of control by a group of
shareholders should still normally trigger realization.
This section demonstrates that when a majority interest is
surrendered in a transaction in which a corporation is reincorporated in the
same jurisdiction, the requisite material difference for realization will
normally exist. Although this conclusion deviates from conventional
thought, 139 it may appear to be insignificant because of its narrow scope. But
business judgment rule. Alternatively, the majority may seek to force the minority
shareholder out of the enterprise on terms which the minority shareholder believes
are unfair.").
137. Situations will of course exist where a 50 percent owner can exercise
control. For example, if other shares are owned by family members under the
influence of the 50 percent owner, he may effectively control a majority of the stock.
Moreover, control could be exercised if a shareholders' agreement creating a voting
block exists.
138. See supra Part III.C.
139. See Cummings, A General Theory, supra note 67, at 1195 ("[A] samestate reincorporation is not inherently a realization event, even if it involves an actual
property exchange from one corporation to another (as in Weiss).").
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stripping away this potential exception to realization has significant
implications for dilutive transactions that, unlike Weiss v. Steam, do not
involve a physical transfer of the diluted interest.14
B.

Other Transactions That Dilute a Majority Interest to a Minority
Interest Should Normally Trigger Realization Even When the Diluted
Interest is not Physically Transferred

Realization under current law is normally thought to require both an
actual exchange of properties and a material difference between the property
surrendered and the property received. The Weiss v. Steam transaction
satisfied the exchange requirement because the shareholders of Old Acme
transferred all the Old Acme stock for 50% of the New Acme stock and cash.
As demonstrated above, the Weiss v. Steam transaction also likely satisfied
Cottage Savings' material difference requirement because it entailed the
surrender of majority ownership of the enterprise.
In contrast to Weiss v. Steam, many highly dilutive transactions do
not involve a physical transfer of all the shareholder's shares. For example, if
April, the sole shareholder of Oldco, owns 10,000 shares of stock and Oldco
engages in a public offering in which it issues 990,000 additional shares to
new shareholders, April's proprietary interest will be diluted from 100
percent to one percent notwithstanding that she refrained from transferring
any of her shares. Alternatively, if April sold 9,900 of her 10,000 shares to a
third party, her proprietary interest will likewise be diluted to one percent
even though she did not physically transfer all of her shares. As discussed
above, a one percent proprietary interest is almost always materially different
from a 100 percent interest because the power associated with a one percent
interest is miniscule relative to the power associated with a 100 percent
interest. 14 1 When dilution results from a transaction in which the shareholder
does not transfer her entire proprietary interest, does the fact that the
retained, diluted interest was not physically transferred preclude realization?
In our view, realization should not depend on such a formalistic
distinction. 142
140. Corporate level transactions that change the asset content of a
corporation can also be seen as materially changing the shareholders' proprietary
interests, even when their percentage interests remain the same. See Schlunk,
Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 73-74. Because this Article is focused on
shareholder level dilution, the impact of corporate level changes in non-dilutive
transactions is beyond the scope of the Article.
141. See supra Part IV.A.
142. See Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 29-32 (demonstrating the
substantive equivalence of dilution resulting from an exchange of the entire interest
and the exchange of a partial interest).
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As discussed in Part III, by virtue of Supreme Court jurisprudence
subsequent to Steam, "it appears that the Court now considers the realization
requirement satisfied by any tangible, identifiable event that marks an

occasion for acknowledging that the taxpayer's property has increased in
value . .

,143

Moreover, "any definite event . . . could properly be

employed as the occasion for taking account of the taxpayer's gain."' 144 A
dilutive transaction in which the diluted shareholder does not physically
transfer her entire interest is an event that can mark the moment of
realization. Although the diluted shareholder does not physically transfer the
retained interest, the dilution does not occur by mere happenstance. Rather, a
discrete transaction must occur to trigger the dilution. The requisite
transaction must either increase the corporation's outstanding shares (e.g., a
public offering) or reduce the diluted shareholder's stock ownership (e.g., a
sale of some of the shareholder's stock). Hence, a specific event, the
transaction that triggers the dilution, marks the moment of change. If that
specific event leads to a dramatic enough change in the nature of the diluted
shareholder's interest, the dilutive transaction will effectively transform one
property into another. In that situation, even if no physical transfer occurs, in
substance a "deemed exchange" has occurred. The question under current
law, therefore, is whether such a "deemed exchange" of property is sufficient
45
to satisfy the realization requirement. 1
The Code neither endorses nor rejects the notion that a deemed
exchange can trigger a realization event. In fact, the Code does not even
define a realization event. Among the examples of gross income included in
the statute is "[g]ains derived from dealings in property."' 146 This language
dates back to the first modem income tax law in 1913.147 The term
143. Stone, Back to Fundamentals,supra note 88, at 919 (emphasis added).
144. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 81, at 5.1 (emphasis added).
145. Note that we are not arguing for mark-to-market taxation where mere
increases in the value of stock would trigger income without any corresponding
"event." Our argument is that the dilutive transaction can represent the requisite
"event" to trigger realization. Although a constitutional impediment to a mark-tomarket tax system might exist, that barrier does not apply to defining a realization
event. See, e.g., Jensen, The Constitutionalityof Mark-to-Market, supra note 87, at
1299 n. 6 ("What rises to the level of a realization event can be an issue in some

circumstances, but, by anyone's definition, a mark-to-market system does not
require realization." (emphasis added)); Magidenko, Is a Broadly Based, supra note
87, at 954 ("If the tax attaches because of some action, exchange, or change in

circumstance, then it is an excise and indirect, subject only to the geographical
uniformity requirement of the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
146. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
147. The Revenue Act of 1913 imposed a tax on "net income" which
included "gains, profits, and income derived from... sales, or dealings in property.
.." Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, §11(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 17:2

"dealing," however, has yet to be defined and it could certainly encompass a
deemed exchange of property. The Code also provides a formula for
measuring gross income when a "sale or other disposition of property"
occurs. 14 8 But that provision merely quantifies gain or loss after a realization
event occurs; it does not undermine the possibility that a deemed exchange is
sufficient for realization. 149 Congress has enacted specific rules that sanction
realization in the absence of a physical transfer of property. 150 These rules
deal principally with technical issues created by artificial tax regimes applied
to domestic and foreign business enterprises to curtail tax deferral. Congress
has refrained from delineating the contours of realization in more
fundamental, conceptual contexts like the deemed exchange that might result
from a dilutive transaction. Thus, the Code neither sanctions deemed
exchange treatment of a dilutive transaction nor does it impede such
treatment.
Unlike Congress, the Treasury Department has acknowledged that
realization can result from a deemed exchange. The Treasury has developed
this view in a single context, namely, the modification of a debt
instrument. 151 As discussed above, 152 the Treasury Department, relying on
Cottage Savings, promulgated regulations delineating the circumstances in
which the modification of a debt instrument results in a "deemed exchange"
and, therefore, a realization event. 153 These regulations provide that a
148. I.R.C. § 1001(a). This provision dates from 1924. Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, §202(a), 43 Stat. 253, 255.
149. See 1 STANLEY S. SURREY, WILLIAM C. WARREN, PAUL R. MCDANIEL
& HUGH J. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

818

(Foundation Press 1972) ("Section 1001(a) governs the computation of the amount
of gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property. This section does not

determine the inclusion of gains or the amount allowance of losses. Rather, it relates
to gains which have qualified for inclusion under section 61(a) as a result of the
construction of that section .... ") (emphasis omitted); Bacon, Taxable Events, Part
I, supra note 89, at 1248 ("Section 1001(a) assumes that gain or loss has been found
elsewhere in the code to have been realized and then comes into play to declare how
gain or loss is to be computed.").
150. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(3), 475(a), 73 1(a), 877A, 951, 1256, 1293(a);
Mock & Tolin, Realization, supra note, 131, at 591 ("[P]resumably the Supreme
Court's retreat in Bruun and Horst ...

from its strict interpretation of realization

suggests the various deemed realization events in the Code are constitutional.").
151. The Treasury has also acknowledged that realization can occur in the
absence of an actual transfer of property. See Reg. § 1.1001-1 (c)(1) ("Even though
property is not sold or otherwise disposed of, gain is realized if the sum of the
amounts received which are required by section 1016 ...

to be applied against the

basis of the property exceeds such basis.").
152. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
153. See Reg. § 1.1001-3.
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"deemed exchange" occurs when the terms of a debt instrument are
significantly modified even if the original debt instrument is not
surrendered.1 54 Thus, the owner of the original property need not physically
transfer that property for realization to occur. Rather, if the negotiated terms
are sufficient to change the fundamental nature of the underlying property,
realization is deemed to occur. In other words, the debt modification
regulations, like Cottage Savings, focus on the change in the nature of the
underlying property. Under the regulations, if a sufficient change in the
nature of the property results, it is as if the owner transferred the old property
for the new property even if no physical exchange has occurred.
Like the modification of a debt instrument, non-exchange dilutive
transactions should be treated as deemed exchanges in cases where a material
difference exists between a taxpayer's pre-transaction proprietary interest
and the diluted interest retained by the taxpayer. 155 As discussed above, a
dilutive transaction that converts a majority interest to a minority interest
156
generally effectuates a material difference in the nature of the property.
Thus, realization normally should occur in these circumstances, even if the
owner of the diluted interest does not physically transfer the entire
proprietary interest in the dilutive transaction. 57 Congress could certainly
mandate this result. 58 But even in the absence of Congressional action, a
court could rely on Cottage Savings to find that a dilutive transaction

154. See Reg. § 1.1001-3(a) ("[T]his section applies to ... an amendment of
an existing debt instrument.").
155. See Bacon, Taxable Events, Part I, supra note 89, at 1232 ("The
potential reach of Cottage Savings extends far beyond debt workouts to many actual
exchanges of property in kind and modifications the of terms of stocks, bonds, and
contract and property rights of all kinds.") (emphasis added).
156. Seesupra Part IV.A.
157. See Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 67 ("[I]t is theoretically
possible to say that a shareholder's investment represented by his shares of a
corporation's stock has been altered by z%. If the alteration is sufficiently great, it is
proper for the tax law to treat the shareholder as now owning shares in a new and
different corporation, and thus having engaged in an exchange of the original shares
for new shares.").
158. See, e.g., Hariton, Should Share Repurchases, supra note 87, at 179

("[T]he majority's opinion in Eisner v. Macomber ... did not forbid Congress to
recast the form of a transaction that has real economic consequences in a manner that
gives rise to taxable receipts .... It merely held that Congress cannot tax receiptsdeemed or otherwise-arising from a transaction that does nothing at all as an
economic matter .... But clearly, the Constitution does allow Congress to recast
the form of a transaction that has economic consequences for a taxpayer and tax the
resulting deemed receipts as income.").
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resulting in a material change in the shareholder's interest represents 159a
deemed exchange of that interest and thereby results in a realization event..
It should be emphasized that the view advanced in this section
represents a significant departure from current perceptions. Case in point:
Sole shareholder owns stock with a value of $1,000,000 and a basis of
$10,000. Sole shareholder sells 50 percent of the stock for $500,000. If the
circumstances are such that the retained 50 percent interest is materially
different from the previously owned 100 percent interest, our view is that the
entire $990,000 gain should be realized; i.e., both the $495,000 gain in the
shares that are sold and the $495,000 gain in the shares that are retained.
Critics will likely assert that taxing the gain on the retained shares is "unfair"
in these circumstances. 160 They will claim that the taxpayer does not have
the liquidity to pay the tax and it will be administratively difficult to detect
these transactions when they are not self-reported.
These criticisms miss the point of our argument. Our point is that in
a realization based system where the requisite event for triggering realization
is a material change in the underlying property, realization should occur as a
matter of law regardless of whether the event that effectuates the change
involves an actual transfer of the underlying property. Realization is a legal
standard that is not based on equity. When the requisite change in the
underlying property occurs, the deferred gain (or loss) from past appreciation
(or depreciation) should be realized, regardless of whether the property is
physically transferred. 161
Although realization should occur in certain non-exchange, dilutive
transactions, we are not arguing that these transactions should necessarily be
taxed. We are simply stating that the realization requirement should not be
159. This is a mere possibility because it effectively requires a court to reach
a result representing the converse of the Cottage Savings decision. Cottage Savings
establishes that an actual exchange does not result in realization unless the property
received is materially different from the property surrendered. In the dilution
context, the court must find that when the diluted interest is materially different from
the non-diluted interest, a deemed exchange occurs that results in realization. As
such, it is difficult to predict if a court would treat a non-exchange dilutive
transaction as a realization event but such treatment is possible in appropriate
circumstances.
160. See Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at p. 57 ("[M]ost taxpayers
think it is grossly unfair to be taxed on gain from an investment prior to their
disposition of such investment.").
161. See Schlunk, Rationalizing,supra note 20, at 76 (expressing criticism of
a proposal that provided for different consequences when the same substantive effect
results from a transfer of shares and a retention of shares, and arguing for a rule
where "any shareholder of a corporation involved in a reorganization-like transaction
is deemed to experience a realization event, whether or not he continues to own his
original shares.").
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relied on to preclude gain (or loss) from being triggered. The substance of
realization under current law is a material change in the nature of the
underlying property. The presence or absence of a physical transfer of
property is solely a matter of form and should not be dispositive of whether
realization has occurred. 162 Rather than relying on realization to differentiate
taxable and nontaxable dilutive transactions, realization should be seen as the
norm when a majority interest is converted to a minority interest and
Congress should enact nonrecognition rules to implement policy in this area.
Before exploring Congress's role, however, it is desirable to consider
whether those dilutive transactions that do not convert a majority interest to a
minority interest should ever trigger realization.
C.

Dilutive Transactions That Do Not Convert a Majority Interest to a
Minority Interest Should Sometimes Trigger Realization

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a dilutive transaction
resulting in the surrender of a controlling interest normally represents a
fundamental change in the owner's interest and therefore should generally
constitute a realization event, regardless of whether the dilution results from
a physical transfer of the diluted interest. Most dilutive transactions,
however, do not have the effect of converting a majority interest to a
minority interest. Rather, many shareholders will own a minority interest
both before and after a dilutive transaction. In addition, a majority
shareholder might still hold a (smaller) majority interest after a dilutive
transaction. Thus, an effort should be made to identify the line that separates
those dilutive transactions that result in a materially different interest, from
those dilutive transactions that do not reach the material difference threshold.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to devise an objective standard for
distinguishing those dilutive transactions that satisfy the material difference
requirement from those that do not. The issue will almost always turn on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nevertheless, just as the
previous sections identified those classes of dilutive transactions that were
likely to effectuate a material difference, it is useful to identify the opposite
end of the continuum; namely, those dilutive transactions that are unlikely to
effectuate a material difference between the pre-transaction and posttransaction proprietary interests.

162. The view that a material change in the nature of retained property
should trigger realization has implications beyond the corporate dilution context. For
example, the disposition of a partial interest in real property or the improvement of a
parcel of real property could potentially result in a material change in the taxpayer's

investment and arguably trigger a realization event. Whether our view should be
applied in contexts other than corporate dilution is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Dilution is a common event in practice and can occur in tiny
increments to a wide swath of shareholders in everyday transactions. For
example, the issuance of option shares to employees of a public corporation
dilutes every shareholder's interest to some degree. Although the number of
shares held by existing shareholders remains the same, the augmented
amount of outstanding shares reduces the relative interest of each of the
existing shareholders, thereby diluting their interests. A secondary offering
by a publicly held corporation has the same effect: by increasing the
outstanding shares of the corporation, each existing shareholder who does
not acquire shares in the offering suffers a reduction in the shareholder's
relative ownership of the corporation.
A slightly diminished proprietary interest that results from a dilutive
transaction will not normally be materially different from the owner's former
interest. For example, the decline in a public shareholder's proportionate
interest from .00 12 percent to .0011 percent represents a change in interest,
but one would be hard pressed to regard the change as material. From a
practical standpoint, the power of the public shareholder associated with the
retained interest is not altered by the dilution, so the retained interest should
not be regarded as materially different from the original interest.
What factors might be considered in evaluating when a dilutive
transaction results in a materially different interest in cases where a
controlling interest is not surrendered? One obvious factor is the magnitude
of the shareholder's interest before the dilutive transaction. A shareholder
whose interest is diluted arguably should own an interest of some significant
magnitude before the dilution occurs to make it possible for the diluted
interest to be materially different from the original interest. For example, it
seems unlikely that a shareholder who owns less than a five percent or ten
percent interest in a corporation before a dilutive transaction would own a
materially different interest after the transaction occurs. 16 3 Unfortunately,
there is no single, objectively correct, minimum interest threshold from
which a potential material difference can result. In speculating about this
amount, it is useful to consider whether a material difference is likely to exist
if the maximum dilution of that interest were to occur. In other words, if ten
percent is thought to be the minimum ownership threshold that can trigger a
material difference as a result of dilution, one must be comfortable
163. In determining a minimum ownership threshold for dilution potentially
to trigger realization, consideration might be given to including stock owned by
related parties in calculating whether the threshold is met. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§
267(b), 318. Establishing a minimum ownership threshold would exclude the vast
majority of taxable shareholders of publicly traded corporations who hold very small
proprietary interests. This treatment would render the possibility of dilution
triggering a realization event almost exclusively to the shareholders of closely held
corporations.
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concluding that the dilution of a 9.99 percent shareholder's interest to .001
percent cannot constitute a material change in interest. In effect, one must
conclude that the rights and obligations of a 9.99 percent shareholder and a
.001 percent shareholder are not materially different from one another. In
most cases, this conclusion would seem reasonable. In any particular case,
however, an ad hoc determination must be made because even if the interest
of the diluted shareholder is below the minimum threshold, it is possible that
the facts are such that a material difference exists. 164
In addition to establishing a minimum ownership threshold for a
dilutive transaction to normally result in a material difference, another
relevant factor is the extent to which the shareholder's proportionate interest
is reduced by the dilutive transaction. Thus, a material difference is unlikely
to exist in the absence of some meaningful percentage reduction of a
shareholder's proportionate interest. Moreover, the magnitude of the
requisite contraction might differ depending on whether the diluted interest
was that of a majority shareholder or a minority shareholder. In the case of a
majority shareholder, the more that is surrendered, the less practical control
that is retained, and passing various ownership thresholds (e.g., 75 percent,
66-2/3 percent) might significantly change the nature of the shareholder's
control.' 65 Thus, a somewhat smaller decline in proportionate interest might
be deemed to result in realization for a majority shareholder than for a
minority shareholder who has no control over any decision regardless of the
magnitude of her interest. 16 6 Here again, the magnitude of dilution that must
164. For example, if the minimum ownership threshold were ten percent and
a corporation had a 41 percent shareholder, a 9.99 percent shareholder would be in a
stronger position than a .0001 percent shareholder because the former could provide
the 41 percent shareholder with control whereas the latter could not.
165. For example, in Illinois, a two-thirds vote is normally required to
approve a merger or a sale of substantially all the assets of a corporation. 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5 §§l 1.20(a), I 1.60(c) (1983). The two-thirds vote requirement can be

modified by amending the articles of incorporation to provide that a larger or smaller
majority is needed. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 §§l1.20(b), 11.60(e) (1983). See
generally
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166. For example, the relative interest of a diluted majority shareholder who
retains a majority interest might be required to decline by at least 20 percent for a
material difference to exist (e.g., the transaction would need to dilute a 75 percent
shareholder to 60 percent (or less) for realization to occur). See Commissioner. v.
Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 91, 99 (1987) (holding that reduction in interest of controlling

shareholders from 72.5 percent to 68.5 percent did not represent a significantly
different interest because the taxpayers remained in control in the corporation in a

case involving a non pro rata contribution of shares to capital in which taxpayers
attempted to deduct the loss.). By contrast, a more significant reduction might be

required in the case of a diluted minority shareholder whose interest normally has
very little power before the dilution occurs. See Griffith, Realization and
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occur for realization is not clear-any guideline would be an arbitrary effort
in realization and would
to constrain the instances in which dilution results167
always be subject to the facts of the particular case.
The realm of possible dilutive transactions occupies a continuum. At
one extreme, the dilution that occurs almost certainly results in a material
difference that triggers realization. At the other extreme, the dilution almost
certainly does not result in a material difference. Between the two extremes,
the outcome of a particular case is likely to be unclear. Even if all possible
transactions could be located on the continuum, the line that differentiates
those dilutive transactions that normally result in a material difference from
those that do not is impossible to discern. Moreover, even if that line could
be discerned, it would be uncertain whether any particular transaction
represented the general rule or an exception to that rule until the specific
Recognition, supra note 136, at 68 ("Minor reductions in shareholdings will not
result in any practical difference in corporate operations if the post-surrender
ownership percentage exceeds the statutory minimum required for major corporate
decisions such as mergers, liquidations or the sale of assets other than in the ordinary
course of business. In these cases, the shareholder remains in effective control
regardless of the surrender."). Thus, a minority shareholder's interest might be
required to decline by at least 40 percent before the dilution could trigger realization
(e.g., the transaction would need to dilute a 30 percent shareholder to 18 percent (or
less)). Requiring a significant reduction in the interest of a minority shareholder to
trigger realization in a dilutive transaction is the converse of the approach taken to
determine when a redemption of a minority shareholder qualifies for sale treatment
under I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) where almost any reduction in a minority interest is treated
as a sale for tax purposes. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 C.B. 161 (reduction
from 11 percent to 9 percent satisfied I.R.C. § 302(b)(1)); Rev. Rul. 76-364, 1976-2
C.B. 91 (reduction from 27 percent to 22.27 percent satisfied I.R.C. § 302(b)(1)).
167. In determining how much dilution is necessary to trigger realization, it
is helpful to consider the converse of a dilutive transaction; namely, a corporate
transaction that results in accretion. Under I.R.C. § 305, a shareholder whose
proprietary interest increases in a transaction that diminishes the interests of other
shareholders can be taxed on the increase in the shareholder's proportionate interest
even though the shareholder does not participate in the transaction. See Stone, Back
to Fundamentals, supra note 88, at 928-930; James A. Hime, The Application of
Sections 305(b) and 305(c) to Redemptions, Recapitalizationsand Acquisitions, 48
TAX LAW. 375, 403-06 (1995). Not surprisingly, Congress takes a very restrictive
view of the circumstances in which it is appropriate to tax a nonparticipating
shareholder in these transactions. Treating dilutive transactions as realization events
is arguably a less extreme action than taxing accretive transactions because of the
different nature of the potential income in the two cases. In an accretive transaction,
Congress is taxing the beneficiary of the accretion on a benefit derived when the
accretive transaction occurs. By contrast, in the case of a dilutive transaction, a
benefit was derived as the proprietary interest appreciated, not when the dilutive
transaction occurs. The dilutive transaction would merely mark the time of
realization.
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facts of the case were considered. Thus, although dilution can result in
realization, uncertainty will inevitably exist as to whether a particular
dilutive transaction triggers a realization event.
D.

Congress Should Enact Policy-Based Nonrecognition Rules to
Differentiate Taxable and Nontaxable Dilutive Transactions

Once it is acknowledged that some level of dilution can effectuate
the material change required for realization, realization ceases to operate as a
convenient standard for determining whether a dilutive transaction is taxable.
Although general rules governing when dilution results in realization might
be formulated, some degree of uncertainty will almost always exist. This
uncertainty exists because the facts of the particular case normally control
whether a diluted interest is "materially different" from a previously
undiluted interest. 168 For purposes of administration, therefore, it is
undesirable to rely on the common law of realization to determine whether a
dilutive transaction is taxable. Instead, Congress should determine when, as a
policy matter, a gain should be taxed or a loss should be allowed in a dilutive
transaction and enact appropriate nonrecognition rules to implement this
result. 169 Since 1924, Congress has exercised its prerogative to defer gain and
loss after a realization event occurs by enacting nonrecognition rules. 70
Congress should consider liquidity, valuation and fairness issues in the
course of enacting appropriate nonrecognition rules to govern dilutive
transactions.
An existing set of nonrecognition rules applies to many dilutive
transactions. The corporate reorganization rules confer nonrecognition
168. As two commentators have remarked, "One possibility is to do nothing
and live with common law case-by-case decisions. . . ." See Bacon, Taxable Events,
PartH,supra note 125, at 1395.
169. See Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 55 (suggesting that
nonrecognition rules might have been utilized as a backstop by Congress to guard
against the possibility that the courts and the Commissioner would define realization
too liberally).
170. The concept of recognition was introduced in the Revenue Act of 1921
but recognition was generally the exception, rather than the rule, at this time. See
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230. Under the 1921 Act,
when an exchange of property occurred, gain or loss was not recognized unless the
property received by the taxpayer had a "readily realizable market value." The
Revenue Act of 1924 reversed the presumption in favor of not taxing exchanges.
Instead, the 1924 Act treated an exchange as a realization event and provided that all
realized gains and losses are recognized, except when Congress carves out specific
exceptions that merit deferred taxation. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(a),
43 Stat. 253, 257. The general rule of recognition of realized gains and losses still
exists today. See I.R.C. § 1001 (c).

92

treatment
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71

transactions.' Indeed, the transaction in Steam likely would qualify as a
corporate reorganization under current law.' 72 Hence, even if, as we have
argued, a realization event occurred in that transaction, the shareholder level
gains attributable to the New Acme stock received in the exchange would not
be recognized under current law.'73
As a general matter, the corporate reorganization rules accommodate
extreme dilution because these rules focus exclusively on the nature of the
consideration received in the transaction.' 74 A continuing proprietary interest

is required by these rules, but nonrecognition treatment is not dependent
upon the magnitude of that interest. As such, a small target ("housefly") can
be swallowed by a large acquiring corporation ("elephant") in a transaction
in which the elephant issues its stock as consideration for the acquisition and
the shareholders of the housefly will be accorded nonrecognition treatment.
171. When a corporate acquisition qualifies as a "reorganization" (as defined
in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)), the target corporation is accorded nonrecognition (I.R.C. §
361) and the target shareholders are accorded nonrecognition with respect to stock
received in the acquiring corporation (I.R.C. § 354).
172. The transaction in Weiss v. Steam would probably qualify as a
nondivisive "D" reorganization under current law. I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D). This
treatment would result by virtue of a 1986 amendment that reduces the necessary
control threshold from 80 percent to 50 percent to satisfy the reorganization
definition. Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514, § 1804(h)(2) (adding I.R.C. §
368(a)(2)(H)). This reduction in the ownership threshold for control was designed to
support the government's effort to thrust reorganization treatment on taxpayers in
certain liquidation-reincorporation transactions that were designed by taxpayers to
exploit the low capital gains tax rates that applied to individuals. See generally,
Kelley Walsh White, The Type D ReorganizationAfter 1986: A Case for Repeal, 21
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 123 (1989). The Weiss v. Steam transaction might also qualify as
an "F" reorganization under current law but we do not believe that form of
reorganization is satisfied by the 50 percent shift in proprietary interest that occurred
in the transaction.
See Prop. Reg. §§ 1.368-2(m)(l)(i)(B) (limiting F
reorganizations to transactions in which "there is no change in the ownership of the
corporation in the transaction ...... ), 1.368-2(m)(5) Ex. (1) (illustrating this
limitation).
173. I.R.C. § 354.
174. The reorganization rules focus only on the nature of the consideration
received and are not concerned with the amount of dilution that occurs in the
transaction. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(B) (consideration must be "solely voting
stock"); I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (same, subject to the "boot relaxation rule" of §
368(a)(2)(B) that can allow up to 20 percent non-stock consideration in certain
cases); Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v) Ex. I (mandating at least 40 percent stock
consideration in a merger). No statutory or common law restrictions exist on the
extent to which the transaction dilutes the target shareholders' proprietary interests.
See BORRIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 7th ed.,
12.21, 12.23 [1], 12.24[ 1].
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This treatment is conferred notwithstanding that the 100 percent ownership
interest of the shareholders of the housefly is diluted to a miniscule
proprietary interest in the elephant. Commentators have long criticized
Congress and the Treasury for conferring tax deferral in these highly dilutive
transactions but, for the most part, that criticism has fallen on deaf ears.' 7 5
Although the corporate reorganization rules address dilution by
default in certain exchange transactions, no evidence exists that they were
drafted with this issue in mind. Moreover, neither the corporate
reorganization rules (nor any other existing nonrecognition rules 17 6) apply to
those dilutive transactions that are outside the scope of these rules. Hence,
the reorganization rules do not provide a comprehensive answer to the
question of when dilutive transactions should be taxed.
It would be desirable for Congress to examine the general question
of when dilutive transactions should result in recognition of gain or loss and
when nonrecognition should be conferred. Congress could resolve this issue
by adopting an all or nothing position; i.e., allowing all dilutive transactions
that constitute realization events to be immediately taxed, or enacting blanket
nonrecognition rules for such dilutive transactions. Rather than adopting
either of these extreme positions, Congress could take a middle ground and
enact targeted nonrecognition rules that defer tax on certain dilutive

175. See Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free
Incorporationsand Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11. VA. TAX REv. 349,
396 (1991) ("[T]he continuity of [proprietary] interest requirement does nothing to

ensure that the nature of the transferor's investment remains substantially the
same."); Jerome H. Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes and Realism, 71 HARV. L REv. 254,
261 (1957) ("[M]any of the exchanges permitted by the reorganization provisions are
changes 'merely in form' only as judged by highly artificial standards; that
stockholders.., obtain interests in the merged companies which cannot properly be
regarded .

.

. as . . . 'continuing their former interest' ....

). For a proposal to

mitigate the permissible dilution, see II ALl Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X601 (Feb.
1954 Draft) (requiring target shareholders to own at least 20 percent of combined
enterprise for transaction to qualify as a reorganization); H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess., §354 (1954) (adopting 20 percent principle similar to the ALl
recommendation). Although Congress has not addressed the dilution issue, it has
taken small steps to restrict the nature of the investment that qualifies for
nonrecognition treatment. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(A) (taxing excess principal
amount of securities received over securities surrendered); 354(a)(2)(C) (taxing
excess of nonqualified preferred stock received over nonqualified preferred stock
surrendered).

176. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 721(a) that confer nonrecognition to certain
taxpayers who transfer property to a corporation or a partnership without regard to
the magnitude of dilution that results.
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transactions but allow an immediate tax to be imposed on transactions
outside the scope of the targeted rules.' 77
In sum, the view that dilution of an ownership interest can never
trigger realization should be rejected. Dilutive transactions should result in
realization when the diluted interest is materially different from the former
interest, regardless of whether the dilutive transaction entails an actual
transfer of the retained interest. Realization, however, is a poor mechanism
for distinguishing between taxable and non-taxable dilutive transactions
because the material difference standard requires a fact intensive inquiry. As
such, realization should be seen as the norm in transactions involving
substantial dilution and Congress should enact nonrecognition rules to
implement policy goals in this area.' 78
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal income tax was a mere decade old when the Supreme
Court decided Weiss v. Steam. Accordingly, the common law of realization
was in its infancy at that time. Thus, it is not surprising that the Court
refrained from wading into the dark waters of shareholder dilution when it
rendered its decision. Unfortunately, the case continues to be cited favorably
by the Court and the flaw in the decision (the Court's failure to confront the
dilution issue) has been deeply buried by the passage of time.
The law of realization has been significantly liberalized since Steam
was decided. As such, the dilution that occurred in Stearn would likely be
177. Commentators have delineated the implications of blanket recognition,
blanket nonrecognition, and a targeted system between the two extremes. See
Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 63-81 (delineating full range of
nonrecognition alternatives and commentators favoring each one).
178. It is unlikely that any taxpayer who might potentially realize a gain in a
dilutive transaction will report the gain since no authority mandates this result under
current law. However, if Congress

does not enact a rational system of

nonrecognition for dilutive transactions, taxpayers with a potential loss might take
the position the loss is realized in a dilutive transaction since no authority bars that
result. For example, a 100 percent shareholder with an unrealized loss who sells 51
percent of her stock might claim the loss in the retained 49 percent interest if no
nonrecognition rule applied. This would not be the first time that taxpayers have
endeavored to accelerate losses. See Bacon, Taxable Events, PartI, supra note 89, at
1236-37 (acknowledging potential for whipsaw created by Cottage Savings
decision); Griffith, Realization and Recognition, supra note 136, at 70-81
(suggesting that realized loss in non pro rata contribution to capital cases could be
recognized and allowed); Schlunk, Rationalizing, supra note 20, at 65 ("[I]t is
possible that such inconsistency would be exploited by taxpayers seeking to
accelerate losses... "). Even if a realization event occurred in these circumstances,

it is not clear that the realized loss would be allowed as a deduction; i.e., a loss might
not be sustained in these circumstances. See I.R.C. § 165(a).
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regarded as triggering a realization event if the same facts were put before
the Court today. More significantly, the analysis leading to this conclusion
suggests that realization should occur in heavily dilutive transactions even if
the diluted interest is not physically transferred in the transaction.
Because the material difference standard for realization under
current law requires an ad hoc inquiry to determine whether a dilutive
transaction constitutes a realization event, realization should not be relied on
to differentiate taxable and nontaxable dilutive transactions. Instead,
Congress should regard all transactions involving substantial dilution as
triggering realization and implement policy goals in this area by enacting
appropriate nonrecognition rules. Now that nine decades have passed since
the Stearn decision was rendered, it is high time for the impact of dilution on
realization to be clarified.

